What tax incentives encourage energy production from fossil fuels?
Provisions of the federal income tax that subsidize domestic production of fossil fuels include the expensing of exploration, development, and intangible drilling costs; the use of percentage depletion instead of cost depletion to recover drilling and development costs of oil and gas wells and coal mining properties; and numerous smaller incentives for production and distribution of oil, coal, and natural gas.
Various tax incentives promote investment in fuel development, presumably diverting capital from investments in other assets with higher pretax yields. Several studies have found that the effective tax rate—the extent to which all applicable tax provisions reduce the after-tax return on new investment—is much lower for oil, gas, and coal development than for other assets. The Obama administration has proposed eliminating these incentives, but Congress has taken no action.
Supporters justify these tax incentives as a means of reducing US dependence on imported oil. But they also encourage more rapid exhaustion of domestic supplies, which may increase dependence on imports in the long run. The two largest energy tax incentives are expected to reduce federal tax revenue by between $6 billion and $14 billion from 2014 to 2018, depending on the agency doing the estimate. All the incentives combined will reduce revenue over the same period by between $9 billion and $24 billion (figure 1).
Intangible drilling costs cover the labor, machinery, and materials needed for drilling and developing oil and gas wells and coal mines. Independent oil and gas producers (i.e., those without related refining and marketing operations) may deduct these costs from income in the year incurred, even though, as capital investments, they produce returns over many years. Integrated oil and gas companies may deduct 70 percent of these costs in the first year and recover the remaining 30 percent over the next five years.
With percentage depletion, producers can deduct a fixed percentage of gross revenue from a property as capital expenses each year; in contrast, with conventional cost depletion, producers deduct their actual outlays as the resources from a well or mine are depleted. The federal income tax allows independent producers—but not integrated companies—to deduct 15 percent of gross revenue from their oil and gas properties as percentage depletion, without regard to how much they have invested in the properties. Percentage depletion is permitted only on the company’s first 1,000 barrels per day from a property and is limited to net income from oil and gas properties. Percentage depletion is also available for coal and other minerals at varying rates.
The tax law includes several smaller (but hardly trivial) incentives for investments in refineries, pipelines, oil and gas exploration, and selected coal technologies. In addition, domestic energy properties benefit from the domestic production deduction provided in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. The Obama administration has proposed denying oil and gas companies the benefits of the domestic production deduction, even though the deduction does not favor oil and gas over other domestic manufacturing.
Subsidizing domestic production of fossil fuels is inconsistent with the policy goal of reducing fossil fuel use to counter global climate change. But the adverse effects of the incentives on climate change are minor because any increase in domestic production they induce mostly displaces imports rather than raising domestic fuel consumption.
Some prior research concludes that the incentives reduce the world market price of oil by less than 0.1 percent, which would barely effect consumption of gasoline and other oil-based products. Moreover, a recent study by the National Academy of Sciences finds that subsidies for oil and gas production may slightly reduce greenhouse gas emissions by accelerating the conversion of electricity production facilities from coal to natural gas.
Office of Management and Budget. Analytical Perspectives, Tax Expenditures. Table 14.1. “Estimates of Total Income Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2014–2024.”
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Joint Committee on Taxation. 2014. “Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2014–2018.” JCX-97-14. Washington, DC: Joint Committee on Taxation.
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