

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

Transfer Pricing: Strategies, Practices, and Tax Minimization

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Research Question

- How do U.S. multinational corporations' transfer pricing strategies and practices affect their tax minimization outcomes?
- Objective: Critically examine role of transfer pricing in corporate tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010)



Multinational Corporation = Tax Avoider



- “Asda, Google, Apple, eBay, Ikea, Starbucks, Vodafone: all pay minimal tax on massive UK revenues, mostly by diverting profits earned in Britain to their parent companies, or lower tax jurisdictions via royalty and service payments.”



– The Guardian Oct 31, 2012

How?... Transfer Pricing!



- “**Transfer pricing** is the practice of multinational corporations of arranging intrafirm sales such that most of the profit is made in a low-tax country.” - Hassett and Newmark (2008)
- The Economist, Feb 16, 2013:
 - “One of the main vehicles of corporate tax avoidance is a practice known as **transfer pricing**.”
 - “**Transfer pricing** (really mispricing) is sometimes also used to load costs onto countries that offer generous subsidies... It has become a key plank of multinational tax strategies.”



Transfer Pricing: The Basics

U.S. Parent ($t=35\%$) \longrightarrow Irish Subsidiary ($t=12.5\%$)

Items sold at/near cost.

- U.S. recognizes little income
- Costs are deducted in high-tax U.S. jurisdiction
- Cash gets to U.S. without paying repatriation tax

Items sold to customers at high mark-up.

- Ireland recognizes high income
- High income lightly taxed
- Can send to other countries for sale and it will not be subject to Irish tax.



Transfer Pricing: The Basics

- Better Strategy:

U.S. Parent ($t=35\%$)

Items sold at/near cost.
--U.S. recognizes little income
--High Costs are deducted in high-tax jurisdiction
--Cash gets to U.S. without paying repatriation tax

Irish Subsidiary ($t=12.5\%$)


Items purchased from Bermuda have a high mark-up = high cost.
--Recognize little income in Ireland (and what you do gets lightly taxed)

Bermuda Subsidiary

($t = 0\%$) Items sold at very high mark-up.
--Bermuda recognizes very high income
--High income not taxed at all.
--Lax regulatory regime
--Cash gets to Bermuda from Ireland



U.S.: From “Tax Haven” to High Taxed




Do Multinationals Avoid Taxes via Transfer Pricing?

Prior Research:

- Klassen, Lang, and Wolfson (1993)
- Jacob (1996)
- Dyreng and Lindsey (2009)
- Donohoe, McGill and Outslay (2012)
- Dyreng and Markle (2013 WP)

Public data

- Consolidated ETR
- Foreign/Domestic ETR
- IOK: in what countries there are entities
- Geographic sales



Do Multinationals Avoid Taxes via Transfer Pricing?


Other data

BEA

- Size of transfers by firm between countries
- Country-level intrafirm trade

Current Research:

- Blouin, Robinson, and Seidman (2012)



Conclusion

- Multinational corporations use transfer pricing to avoid taxes.
- But . . .



Tax Authorities are Reacting



I pity the fool
who abuses
transfer prices!

- “IRS Brings ‘A Team’ to Crush Transfer Pricing Abuse”
– Forbes March 2012
- “OECD Urges International Tax Clampdown on
Multinationals” – Reuters Feb 13, 2013



Multinationals Seeking Certainty

- “Companies should pursue tax **certainty**” – E&Y 2012
- “What you need is **certainty** and that’s what you don’t get in India” – KPMG 2013
- Arm’s length principle: not easy to determine.
- Advance Pricing Agreements (APA)
- “Competent Authority” arbitration
 - Resolution of TP between firm & *n* countries’ tax authorities
 - However, not binding



Variation in the Tax Function

- MNCs' approaches to taxes are not uniform
- Firms balance tax incentives with nontax & financial reporting effects differently
 - Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin (2010, 2011)
- Tax department goals can be different, and affect ETRs differently
 - Robinson, Sikes, and Weaver (2010)
- Transfer pricing tax function remains unexplored



How is Tax Minimization affected by Firm-Specific Transfer Pricing Goals and Practices?

Our Survey Data

- Assess effectiveness of Transfer Pricing Practice
- Experience of Tax Director
- Budget for Transfer Pricing
- Mix of Planning and Compliance



Survey

- Obtain inside tax information from 219 MNCs
 - Traditional archival data sources are inadequate
- In cooperation with Tax Executives Institute (TEI)
- Survey ran October - December 2010
- Sent to every Int'l TEI member, plus one reminder
 - Response Rate = 8.1%
- Responses are optional
 - Consistent with previous surveys (GHS 2010, 2011)



Survey Caveats

- Voluntary responses
- Respondent must be member of TEI
- Potential interpretation issues
- Remedies:
 - Asked who filled out survey:
 - VP Tax (39%), Tax Director (40%), Tax Manager (19%), CFO (2%)
 - Validated demographics on external data:
Our survey vs. 2005 mandatory TEI survey (Table 1)




Survey Analysis


- Responses Overall
- Responses by Firm Characteristic
 - ETR
 - International Exposure
 - Tax Budget
 - Tax Planner
 - Asset Size
 - Low Cash Tax Goal
 - R&D
 - TP Experience
 - NOL
 - Underfunded TP
 - Public
 - Compliance Goal
- OLS regression
 - Provide a multivariate control framework



Number of Years of Transfer Pricing Experience




#Respondents with TP Experience in Countries




Tax Resources Consumed by Transfer Pricing

10 Years Ago:


Non-mfg, high intl,
more experienced tax
directors spend higher %
of resources on TP.




Current Year:




Transfer Pricing Burden (Relative to Other Tax Issues)




Resource Adequacy for Transfer Pricing




Transfer Pricing Compliance vs. Planning Resources



% of Transfer Pricing Compliance & Planning Outsourced




Quality of Tax Authorities' TP Auditors (5=best)




More mfg than non-mfg firms operate in high-quality jurisdictions

Transfer Pricing Risk by Country (5=most risky)



Public, large, and high non-U.S. asset firms operate in riskier TP countries.

Goals of Transfer Pricing Practice within MNC



Link Between Tax Minimization and Firm-Specific TP Attributes

<i>Correlation Coefficients</i>	<i>ETR</i>
Low Cash Tax Goal	-0.22**
Compliance Goal	0.28**
High International	-0.24**
Tax Budget	-0.19
High Planner	-0.12
Assets (Logged)	-0.26**
R&D	-0.25**
TP Experience	-0.28**
NOL	0.02
Underfunded TP	0.14
Public	-0.17*
Tax Haven Benefit	-0.07



<i>OLS Results. Dep. Variable: ETR</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)
Low Cash Tax Goal	-0.037***		
Compliance Goal	0.054***		
Low Cash Tax Goal Only		-0.062***	
Compliance Goal Only			0.064***
High International	-0.008	-0.013	-0.011
Tax Budget	-14.98***	-15.290***	-17.110***
High Planner	-0.032**	-0.028*	-0.027
Assets (Logged)	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.019***
R&D	-0.075***	-0.076***	-0.076***
TP Experience	-0.043*	-0.044*	-0.043**
NOL	0.012	0.011	0.014
Underfunded TP	0.035	0.034	0.035
Public	-0.026	-0.029*	-0.020
Tax Haven Benefit	-0.067***	-0.054***	-0.063***
Constant	0.496***	0.539***	0.495***
<i>Adjusted R²</i>	51.9%	48.2%	49.7%
<i>n</i>	65	65	65

Conclusions

- Do MNCs avoid taxes through transfer pricing?
- It Depends!...
 - On how TP practice is assessed: compliance vs. avoidance
 - On financial resources for TP (budget)
 - On human capital (experience)
- Importantly, more MNCs now seem to be concerned about tax *compliance* than tax *minimization*.




Thank You!
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
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Tax Environment: Tax Audit



Large, Public, Intl,
low U.S.-asset concentration firms
more likely to be audited more

Tax Environment: Tax Litigation over Past 3 Years



Reputation Cost of Losing Tax Dispute w.r.t. TP (vs. non-TP) Issue

