Skip to main content
  • Experts
  • Events
  • Briefing Book
  • Resources
  • About
  • Contact
  • Support
  • Fiscal Facts
Twitter
Facebook
Logo Site
  • Topics
    • Individual Taxes
    • Business Taxes
    • Federal Budget and Economy
    • State and Local Issues
    • Campaigns, Proposals, and Reforms
  • TaxVox Blog
  • Research & Commentary
  • Laws & Proposals
  • Model Estimates
  • Statistics
  • Features
Research report

First, Do No Harm: Designing Tax Incentives for Health Insurance

Leonard E. Burman, Amelia Gruber
May 21, 2001
Download PDFPrint
Share

Primary tasks

  • Overview(active tab)
  • Full Report

Abstract

A bipartisan consensus favors public policy initiatives to expand health insurance coverage. This paper summarizes new CPS data on health insurance coverage for the nonelderly and discusses the issues involved in subsidizing health insurance. We outline a tax credit option designed to diminish many health insurance market flaws. A simple model illustrates that the Administrations recent proposal for tax credits for nongroup insurance alone is equivalent to a general insurance tax credit (our preferred option) with a tax on ESI. Thus, it runs the risk of doing harm - undermining the insurance that currently covers most nonelderly Americans.

Research Area

Federal Budget and Economy Individual Taxes
To reuse content from the Tax Policy Center, visit copyright.com, search for the publications, choose from a list of licenses, and complete the transaction.

Meet the Experts

  • Leonard E. Burman
    Institute Fellow
  • Amelia Gruber
Brief

Understanding the Maze of Recent Child and Work Incentive Proposals

Elaine Maag, Nikhita Airi
June 1, 2020
  • Donate Today
  • Topics
  • TaxVox Blog
  • Research & Commentary
  • Laws & Proposals
  • Model Estimates
  • Statistics
  • Privacy Policy
  • Newsletters
Twitter
Facebook
  • © Urban Institute, Brookings Institution, and individual authors, 2020.