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    <title>Tax Policy Center: Pensions, Tax Incentives for Saving</title>
    <link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org</link>
    <description>Tax Policy Center reports on: Pensions, Tax Incentives for Saving - The Tax Policy Center is a joint venture of the Urban Institute and Brookings Institution. The Center is comprised of nationally recognized experts in tax, budget, and social policy who have served at the highest levels of government.</description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <copyright>Copyright 2012 Tax Policy Center</copyright>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 07 Feb 2012 21:00:20 EST</lastBuildDate>
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    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Do Low-Income Workers Benefit from 401(k) Plans? (Full Report)]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Economists frequently assume that employees pay for employer-provided fringe benefits, such as contributions to retirement plans, in the form of reduced wages. This paper challenges these assumptions. Because low-income employees receive little tax benefit from saving in qualified retirement plans, they may not be willing to accept a one dollar reduction in their wage in return for an additional dollar contributed to their 401(k) plan. We find that employers reduce wages of high-income workers by 90 to 99 cents for every dollar contributed to a 401(k) plan, but they reduce wages of low-income workers by only 11 to 29 cents.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=412463&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Eric Toder, Karen E. Smith)</author>
        <pubDate>Fri, 09 Dec 2011 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
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	<title><![CDATA[Do Low-Income Workers Benefit from 401(k) Plans? (Brief)]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Economists frequently assume that employees pay for employer-provided fringe benefits, such as contributions to retirement plans, in the form of reduced wages. This paper challenges these assumptions. Because low-income employees receive little tax benefit from saving in qualified retirement plans, they may not be willing to accept a one dollar reduction in their wage in return for an additional dollar contributed to their 401(k) plan. We find that employers reduce wages of high-income workers by 90 to 99 cents for every dollar contributed to a 401(k) plan, but they reduce wages of low-income workers by only 11 to 29 cents.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001578&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Eric Toder, Karen E. Smith)</author>
        <pubDate>Fri, 09 Dec 2011 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
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	<title><![CDATA[The Shrinking Tax Preference for Pension Savings: An Analysis of Income Tax Changes, 1985-2007]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The value of the tax preference for pensions depends on the marginal tax schedule and on the tax treatment of income from assets held outside a pension account. We find that changes in U.S. tax law, especially the reduction in tax rates on capital gains and dividends, but also the decline in marginal tax rates, have led to sizeable changes in the value of the pension tax preference. On balance the value of the pension tax preference to worker-savers is modestly lower than it was in the mid-1980s and substantially lower than it was in the late 1980s.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=412094&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Gary T. Burtless, Eric Toder)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2010 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/412094_shrinking_tax.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="299566"/>
		
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	<title><![CDATA[Personal savings need a boost]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The Washington Times.  America's days of economic  dominance are numbered because we don't save. The government is borrowing like  crazy, and households aren't doing much better. The personal savings rate --  the share of after-tax income that people set aside for a rainy day -- has been  falling like a stone since the early 1980s.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=901298&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2009 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
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	<title><![CDATA[Automatic Enrollment in IRAs: Costs and Benefits]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[To encourage better retirement saving, President Obama recently proposed policies that would require firms without retirement savings plans to automatically enroll their workers in IRAs. In addition, the president proposed an expansion of the Saver's Credit to be fully refundable and available to middle-income taxpayers. This report estimates the revenue costs and distributional effects of the president's proposals.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001312&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Benjamin H. Harris, Rachel M. Johnson)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2009 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001312_auto_enroll.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="518451"/>
		
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	<title><![CDATA[Distributional Effects of Tax Expenditures]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The largest tax preferences for housing, health care, and retirement saving reduce federal revenues by about 3 percent of GDP.  They raise after-tax income proportionally more for higher income groups than lower income groups, but raise income proportionately less for those at the very top. The net distributional effects depend on how these tax preferences are financed. If paid for with higher marginal tax rates, they benefit upper-middle income taxpayers at the expense of both lower-income and the highest-income taxpayers, but if paid for by lower per-capita spending, all high-income groups gain and all low-income groups lose.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411922&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Benjamin H. Harris, Katherine Lim, Eric Toder)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2009 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
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	<title><![CDATA[Beyond the Storm: New Reforms for 401(k) Plans]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The financial crisis has provoked calls for a fundamental reform of the nation's retirement saving structure. This article argues that rather than dismantle the existing system, policymakers should build on existing reforms and expand the automatic 401(k) to help eligible workers save more and make better investment decisions. In addition, retirees should be given the opportunity to test-drive annuity products to realize the benefits of receiving stable retirement income, and near-retirees should be provided the option of incrementally purchasing annuity units over time to help mitigate the risk associated with varying interest rates.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001279&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Benjamin H. Harris, Lina Walker)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2009 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001279_beyond_storm.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="494749"/>
		
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	<title><![CDATA[Taxation of Saving for Retirement: Current Rules and Alternative Reform Approaches]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Most advanced countries exempt returns to retirement saving from income tax, but private saving rates are falling and many people are saving too little for retirement.  There is a trade-off between the goals of promoting wide participation in retirement saving plans and allowing more choice to employees.  In the United States, purely employer funded plans have been replaced by plans that rely more on voluntary employee contributions, while private saving has declined.  Two approaches that may promote more retirement saving are refundable tax credits for low-income workers and rules that encourage or require automatic enrollment in retirement saving plans.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411865&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Eric Toder)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2009 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411865_toder_australia.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="212238"/>
		
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	<title><![CDATA[Tax Proposals in the 2010 Budget]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[President Obama's 2010 Budget contains a number of tax provisions that would cut taxes for low- and middle-income households and raise taxes on wealthier taxpayers. This resource guide describes the tax proposals, offers more detailed commentary on key provisions, and links to tables showing the distributional effects of the overall proposal and various elements of the plan.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411849&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Rosanne Altshuler, Leonard E. Burman, Howard Gleckman, Dan Halperin, Roberton Williams)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2009 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411849_2010_budget.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="410067"/>
		
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	<title><![CDATA[The Economic Crisis and the Fiscal Crisis: 2009 and Beyond]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In 2009, the federal deficit will be larger as a share of the economy than at any time since the 1940s.   After 2009, we project an average deficit of $1 trillion per year for the next 10 years, under optimistic assumptions.  The longer-run picture is even bleaker, with a fiscal gap of 7-9 percent of GDP -- between $1 trillion and $1.3 trillion annually in current dollars.  Recent trends in credit default swap markets suggest that although fiscal policy problems are usually described as medium- and long-term issues, these problems may be upon us much sooner than previously expected.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411843&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Alan J. Auerbach, William G. Gale)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 19 Feb 2009 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411843_economic_crisis.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="126716"/>
		
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	<title><![CDATA[The Automatic 401(k): Revenue &amp; Distributional Estimates]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[One promising aspect of retirement saving policy in recent years is the "automatic" or opt-out features in 401(k) plans. Automatic 401(k)s enable saving even if the worker makes no effort to participate in their 401(k) plan. Prior research has shown that automatic enrollment increased participation in 401(k) from 75 percent to as high as 90 percent of newly eligible employees; with the highest change among lower-income and minority workers. This paper provides estimates of the effects - on federal revenue and the distribution of after-tax income - of a policy under which all 401(k) plans are converted to automatic 401(k)s.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001221&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Christopher Geissler, Benjamin H. Harris)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 30 Oct 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001221_automatic_401.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="229445"/>
		
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	<title><![CDATA[How the Income Tax Treatment of Saving and Social Security Benefits May Affect Boomers' Retirement Incomes]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Income tax provisions affect the buildup of retirement assets during workers' careers and after-tax income following retirement. This paper uses the Urban Institute's DYNASIM model to simulate how potential changes in the tax treatment of retirement saving, Social Security benefits, and income from assets outside retirement accounts may affect boomers' retirement incomes. Changes in the income thresholds for taxing Social Security benefits have the largest impact on middle-income boomers, while changes in contribution limits for retirement saving plans and tax rates on capital gains and dividends have the largest impact on the highest-income boomers.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411629&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Barbara Butrica, Karen E. Smith, Eric Toder)</author>
        <pubDate>Fri, 14 Mar 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411629_retirement_income.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="391425"/>
		
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    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Taxpayer Eligibility for IRAs]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The tax code limits the extent to which individuals may take advantage of the tax benefits associated with traditional and Roth IRAs. The only eligibility criteria for contributing to a Roth IRA are income and filing status. In contrast, eligibility for deducting contributions to a traditional IRA depends on those factors as well as on whether the taxpayer and the taxpayers spouse participate in an employer-provided pension. Taxpayers are subject to an assortment of phaseout ranges based on those criteria.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001147&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Benjamin H. Harris, Christopher Geissler)</author>
        <pubDate>Fri, 07 Mar 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001147_taxpayer_eligibility.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="498101"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Tax Considerations in a Universal Pension System (UPS)]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The inadequacy of the current U.S. public and private pension systems may warrant the establishment of a universal pension system (UPS), which would cover all workersfull-time and part-timeand require them to contribute at a level that can help provide them with adequate incomes when they retire. This paper develops options for a system of individual accounts to which, starting in 2007, each employee or self-employed worker would be required to contribute 3 percent of covered payroll (i.e., 3 percent of up to $97,500 in 2007). The UPS we describe would raise the total "replacement rate" for average wage men to 49.0 percent of final wagesprovided Social Security is fixedor 39.8 percent if not]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411593&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Adam Carasso, Jonathan Barry Forman)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 20 Dec 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411593_universal_pension_system.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="169120"/>
		
    </item>


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	<title><![CDATA[KiwiSaver Evaluation Literature Review : Final Report to Inland Revenue]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[KiwiSaver is a new saving incentive program in New Zealand that requires automatic enrollment of all new employees, with an option to opt out. KiwiSaver also subsidizes participation, but its subsidies are smaller than tax subsidies for saving in qualified retirement plans in the United States. Recent research shows that using automatic enrollment as a default rule substantially increases participation in retirement saving plans, but evidence on whether saving incentives plans increase net saving is mixed. KiwiSaver is the first large-scale test of whether default rules can be more effective than financial incentives in increasing retirement saving.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411400&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Eric Toder, Surachai Khitatrakun)</author>
        <pubDate>Fri, 29 Dec 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411400_KiwiSaver_Final.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="341497"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Tax Policy: Facts and Figures : October 2006]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The early years of the 21st century have been marked by a major tax bill almost every year. This fact sheet looks at the impact of these laws on taxpayers, especially on who benefits and who doesnt, and discusses some unfinished business, including the future of the estate tax and the individual alternative minimum tax.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=901006&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( The Tax Policy Center)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 23 Oct 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/901006_taxpolicy.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="70460"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Roth Conversions as Revenue Raisers: Smoke and Mirrors]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 will extend the low tax rates on capital gains and dividends through 2010, grant temporary relief from the individual alternative minimum tax through 2006, and extend several expiring business tax breaks. To prevent Senators from raising a parliamentary "point of order" that would kill the bill, it had to reduce federal tax revenues by no more than $70 billion.  Meeting this budget target required the inclusion of several tax increase provisions in the package.  One of the largest allows taxpayers to convert IRA balances into so-called Roth IRAs.  The Joint Committee on Taxation reckons that this provision would raise $6.4 billion in revenues over the 10-year budget window.  In fact, this provision would reduce federal revenues over the long term by much, much more than it raises in the short run: On balance, the provision would reduce net long-term federal revenues by $14 billion in present value.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000990&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 11 May 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000990_Tax_Break_05-22-06.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="463868"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Making Maximum Use of Tax-Deferred Retirement Accounts]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Most workers do not contribute the maximum allowable amount to employer-sponsored tax-deferred retirement plans. The share of maximum contributors increased between 1990 and 2003, as did the percentage of participants who contribute the maximum or at least 10 percent of earnings. But virtually all the growth in maximum contributors came from groups with high shares of maximum contributors in 1990. Recent increases in contribution limits can be expected to reduce shares of maximum contributors, but raise relative shares of maximum contributors among high-earning and education groups. Increases in contribution limits do little to increase retirement preparedness among lower-income groups.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411293&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Janette Kawachi, Karen E. Smith, Eric Toder)</author>
        <pubDate>Fri, 17 Mar 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411293_taxdeferred_accounts.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="125812"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Taxing Capital Income : Do We? Should We? Can We? Can We Not?]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, American Tax Policy Institute, and Tax Analysts cosponsored a conference entitled Taxing Capital Income: Do we? Should we? Can we? (Can we not?). The one-day conference brought together leading economists, lawyers and accountants from across the political spectrum to discuss issues surrounding the choice of income or consumption as a tax base.  Sessions addressed each question in the title. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director of the Congressional Budget Office, presented the luncheon address, and a wrap-up panel featured Henry Aaron, Leonard Burman and Dan Halperin. Drafts of the conference papers are available at the ATPI website, http://www.americantaxpolicyinstitute.org/.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411273&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( The Tax Policy Center)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 10 Jan 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411273_ATPI_transcript.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="452246"/>
		
    </item>


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	<title><![CDATA[An Analysis of the Roth 401(k)]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[This report describes the Roth 401(k) and discusses its potential effects. We find that the Roth 401(k) option will add complexity for employees and employers with little collateral social gain. The Roth 401(k) is unlikely to induce significant new private saving; almost all of the benefits are likely to accrue to high-income and wealthy taxpayers who are able to shift existing taxable assets into tax-favored savings plans. Moreover, the Roth 401(k) will increase the amount of resources that taxpayers can shelter and thus will likely have a negative effect on long-term federal budget revenue.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000868&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale, J. Mark Iwry, Gordon McDonald)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 09 Jan 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000868_Tax_Break_01-09-06.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="481221"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Tax Law Changes Allow Employees to Contribute More to Tax-Deferred Accounts]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Since 2001, the dollar limit on employee contributions to employer-sponsored tax-deferred retirement accounts has increased from 32 percent of average earnings ($10,500) in 2001 to 39 percent of earnings in 2006 ($15,000).  Employees over age 50 may make additional "catch-up" contributions, which will raise the total dollar limit for them to 52 percent of average earnings in 2006.   But very few employees contribute the maximum allowable amount.  Of those participating in plans, only 6 percent contributed the maximum amount in 2003.  Additional increases in the contribution limit are likely to reduce the share of those who contribute the maximum.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000856&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Karen E. Smith, Eric Toder)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 19 Dec 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000856_Tax_Fact_12-19-05.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="509732"/>
		
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    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Social Security Reform: One More Time]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[There has been much breast-beating lately about future entitlement spending burdens. The out-year liabilities of Social Security seem quite large$11 trillion in present-value terms. How can the nation ever deal with such major funding problems? While I have offered a specific plan in the past, most notably when I chaired one of the Social Security advisory councils ten years ago, in this paper I focus only on a broader strategy. While the present Social Security system is not by itself terribly far out of long-term actuarial balance, when combined with Medicare, the country is facing major problems in funding projected entitlement spending down the road.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411447&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Edward Gramlich)</author>
        <pubDate>Sun, 25 Sep 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411447_Social_Security.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="71405"/>
		
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    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Penalties on IRAs and 401(k)s]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The leading policy goal for 401(k)-type plans and Individual Retirement Accounts is to help families accumulate wealth for retirement.  Given this objective, policy-makers have created tax penalties for either withdrawing funds too quickly or too slowly.  This Tax Fact explores these tax penalties, and shows that the share of all returns with a penalty has risen steadily over the past decade.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000812&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 15 Aug 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000812_Tax_Fact_8-15-05.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="507759"/>
		
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    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Making the Tax System Work for Low-Income Savers : The Saver's Credit]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The federal tax system provides little incentive for participation in tax-preferred saving plans to households that most need to save more for retirement and whose contributions would most likely represent an actual increase in savings. By contrast, the tax code provides its strongest incentives to those who already are generally better prepared for retirement and who are more likely to use tax-preferred vehicles as a shelter than as an opportunity to increase overall saving. The saver's credit, helps correct this "upside-down" structure of tax incentives for retirement saving.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=311196&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale, J. Mark Iwry, Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 07 Jul 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/311196_IssuesOptions_13.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="99297"/>
		
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    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Extension of Saving and Investment Incentives : Statement before the Subcommittee on Taxation and IRS Oversight of the Committee on Finance, United States Senate]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Congress is considering extending certain tax benefits for saving and investment that are slated to expire over the next several years, including the special rates on capital gains and dividends, the saver's credit, and the deduction for college tuition.  This testimony addresses these provisions' effects on income distribution and saving and highlights the differences between the current special rates for dividends and capital gains and "corporate integration" proposals to end double taxation of corporate equity income and tax all capital income once.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=900821&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Eric Toder)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 30 Jun 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/900821_Toder_063005.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="70575"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Improving Tax Incentives for Low-Income Savers : The Saver's Credit]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The federal tax system provides little incentive for participation in tax-preferred saving plans to households that most need to save more for retirement and whose contributions would most likely represent an actual increase in savings. By contrast, the tax code provides its strongest incentives to those who already are generally better prepared for retirement and who are more likely to use tax-preferred vehicles as a shelter than as an opportunity to increase overall saving. The saver's credit, helps correct this "upside-down" structure of tax incentives for retirement saving.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411177&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale, J. Mark Iwry, Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jun 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411177_TPC_DiscussionPaper_22.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="472928"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Alternatives to Strengthen Social Security : Testimony of C. Eugene Steuerle before the U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Since Social Security was first enacted, vast changes have occurred in the economic and social circumstances of the nation. In testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means, senior fellow Eugene Steuerle addresses Social Security reform and related budget pressures. He presents an array of observations and recommendations dealing with labor force participation, inequities and inefficiencies in the Social Security program, automatic and unsustainable federal spending growth, and private retirement and employee benefit systems.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=900806&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 12 May 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/900806_Steuerle_051205.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="131430"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Role of Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans and National Saving : Testimony before the Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The evidence that retirement and pension incentives have done much recently for national saving is weak. Total personal saving in the United States is now below the annual revenues spent in supporting retirement and pension plans. One major reason is that all government subsidies are for deposits, not saving. A second is the extraordinary complexity of the laws. Yet another negative influence on saving is that most people now retire in late middle age. Finally, the incentives provided to low- and moderate-income households often are also fairly small and sometimes nonexistent. This testimony discusses various ways to try to deal with these issues.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=900814&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 12 Apr 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/900814_Steuerle_041205.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="637552"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Automatic 401(k): A Simple Way To Strengthen Retirement Saving]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The "automatic 401(k)" is a simple concept with enormous potential. An automatic 401(k) plan would have intelligent defaults at each phase of the 401(k) savings cycle:  participation, contribution levels, investment allocations, rollovers, and withdrawal options.  Workers would be free to opt out of these defaults if they chose to.  For example, under an automatic 401(k) workers would participate unless they actively choose not to.  For workers, the automatic 401(k) helps ensure that they make appropriate financial choices even if they are not financial experts.  For plan sponsors, the automatic 401(k) improves nondiscrimination results by increasing lower paid employees to participate and offers a possible way to provide fiduciary and non discrimination safe harbors.  The steps involved in building an automatic 401(k) are not complicated, and the benefits could be substantial; indeed, a growing body of empirical evidence suggests that the automatic 401(k) may be the most promising approach to bolstering retirement security for millions of American families.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000751&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale, J. Mark Iwry, Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 07 Mar 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000751_Tax_Break_3-7-05.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="521956"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Retirement Saving Incentives and Personal Saving]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[To encourage saving for retirement, private pensions such as employer sponsored 401(k) plans or IRAs receive favorable tax treatment by the federal government.   A major goal of such tax provisions is to increase personal saving.  A measure of the value of these tax benefits is provided by the Treasury Department, and the National Income and Product Accounts contains a measure of personal saving. With the sudden drop in personal savings in 1999 and its steady decline in more recent recession years, government tax expenditures on pension benefits began to approach the personal savings level by the end of the 1990s.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000739&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Elizabeth Bell, Adam Carasso, C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 20 Dec 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000739_Tax_Fact_12-20-04.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="518705"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Exempting Dividends, Interest, and Capital Gains From Taxation]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[This article uses the TPC tax model to examine the direct effect of exempting all dividends, interest, and capital gains from income taxation.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000711&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 06 Dec 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000711_Tax_Fact_12-06-04.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="289340"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Executive Compensation Reform and the Limits of Tax Policy]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 includes a major attempt to reform the tax rules for deferred compensation arrangements covering corporate managers.  This paper examines the tax policy and corporate-governance policy objectives of the reform effort, explores the shortcomings of the legislation, and suggests a different approach for future executive compensation reform.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=311113&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Michael Doran)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 23 Nov 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/311113_TPC_dp18.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="268835"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Tax Reform: Prospects and Possibilities : Statement before the Committee on the Budget United States House of Representatives]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The gains in efficiency, equity, and simplicity from systematic tax reform could be substantial. However, to achieve those gains requires attention to many details. Tax reform efforts have failed often, but they have also succeeded, especially when rising problems created the opportunity and demand for reform, and tough issues were tackled in a spirit of bipartisan cooperation.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=900749&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 06 Oct 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/900749_Steuerle_100604.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="253997"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Distributional Effects of Defined Contribution Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[This paper incorporates retirement saving incentives into the Tax Policy Center microsimulation model and analyzes the distributional effects of current tax preferences for saving. As a share of income, tax-preferred saving incentives provide the largest benefits to households with income between $75,000 and $500,000, roughly the 80th to 99th percentile of the income distribution. In 2004, the top 20 percent of tax filing units by income will receive 70 percent of the tax benefits from new contributions to defined contribution plans and almost 60 percent of IRA tax benefits.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=311029&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, Matthew Hall, Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 19 Aug 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/311029_TPC_DP16.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="249239"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Most Households' Medical Expenses Exceed HSA Deductibles]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The 2003 Medicare prescription drug bill created Health Savings Accounts (HSAs), tax-free savings accounts for people who are covered by a "high-deductible health insurance plan," either purchased directly or on their behalf by an employer. The qualifying health insurance plan must have a deductible of at least $1,000 for single coverage and $2,000 for family coverage. Some preventative care may be covered by insurance, but all elective procedures and medicine is subject to the deductibles.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000678&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Linda J. Blumberg, Leonard E. Burman)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 16 Aug 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000678_TaxFacts_081604.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="116605"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Net National Saving]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Net Savingthat is, saving after subtracting depreciation on existing physical assetsis a key determinant of long-term economic growth.  Higher levels of net saving increase the accumulation of capital by Americans, and thereby raise future national income.  In 2003, net national saving amounted to 1.8 percent of net national product (NNP), the lowest share since 1934.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000664&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jun 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000664_TaxFacts_062104.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="267328"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Small Business and Flow-Through Entities]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The composition of income reported on tax returns changes markedly as income increases. On most tax returns, wages and salaries are the dominant source of income. Capital gains become more significant at higher incomes, but even at adjusted gross income (AGI) of $200,000 to $500,000, they only averaged about 12 percent of income in 2000.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000637&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000637_TaxFacts_041204.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="53908"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Key Thoughts on RSAs and LSAs]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In his FY2005 budget, released Monday, President Bush proposes a set of new tax-preferred saving accounts (which were first presented in last year's budget). Under the Administration's proposal, two new types of individual accountscalled Lifetime Saving Accounts (LSAs) and Retirement Saving Accounts (RSAs)would be created. This note provides information to help assess these proposals.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000600&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 04 Feb 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000600.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="27618"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Balances in Defined Contribution Plans and IRAs]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Over the past three decades, the private pension system has shifted toward defined contribution (DC) plans. Despite the shift, most households have little in DC and IRA assets. This report includes a table showing the value of these assets for households headed by someone approaching retirement age. In 2001, the median value of those assets was only $10,400. The data also show that the likelihood of having a DC account or IRA increases markedly as income increases.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000599&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000599_TaxFacts_020204.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="48910"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Cost of Marriage Inequality to Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Seniors : A Human Rights Campaign Foundation Report]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[When a gay, lesbian, or bisexual senior dies, his or her surviving partner faces a financial loss that can amount to tens of thousands of dollars because the couple cannot be recognized as legally married in the United States. Without marriage, Social Security survivor benefits are not available, retirement plans inherited from a partner are heavily taxed, and estate taxes apply to the inheritance of a home. Using data from Census 2000, this report analyzes and quantifies how the lack of legal marriage recognition affects the financial stability of same-sex senior couples.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=410939&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Lisa Bennett, Gary Gates)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/410939_cost_of_marriage_inequality.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="48184"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Composition of Income Reported on Tax Returns]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The composition of income reported on tax returns changes markedly as income increases. On most tax returns, wages and salaries are the dominant source of income. Capital gains become more significant at higher incomes, but even at adjusted gross income (AGI) of $200,000 to $500,000, they only averaged about 12 percent of income in 2000.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000639&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Deborah Kobes)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 10 Nov 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000639_TaxFacts_111003.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="339849"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Impact of Pension Funding on State Government Finances]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Pension funding issues have an important, but often hidden impact on the finances of state governments. If pension systems are underfunded, governments must address this problem sooner or later through additional contributions to the systems. Capital gains have had a dramatic impact on state tax revenues in the last decade. However, the indirect effects of capital gains on state finances through state pension fund growth and decline have had an even greater, but overlooked effect on the long-term fiscal health of states. The last ten years has seen the rapid growth of state pension asset followed by two years of decline. Changes in pension fund asset/liability relationships have generated problems for states that are much larger than the current state budget shortfalls. Pension funding issues do not have the immediacy of the state budget shortfalls, but they must be considered when states address long term structural imbalance problems.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000608&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( J. Fred Giertz)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 18 Aug 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000608.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="1594721"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Reassessing the Fiscal Gap : The Role of Tax-Deferred Saving]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[A variety of recent studies have found that the United States faces a substantial fiscal gap -- that is, a sizable imbalance between projected federal outlays and receipts. A recent study by Boskin (2003) suggests these findings are overstated because they largely or entirely omit projected revenues from tax-deferred saving plans. This paper reassesses estimates of the long-term fiscal status of the United States in light of Boskin's analysis and draws three principal conclusions. First, the nation continues to face a substantial long-term fiscal gap, as conventionally estimated. Second, Boskin's projections of revenue from tax-deferred accounts have only a very modest effect on the long-term fiscal outlook because almost all of the relevant revenue is already incorporated into the revenue projections that generate sizable fiscal gaps. Third, the primary focus of Boskin's analysis is the overall effect on the budget from retirement accounts -- not how much of that effect is already included in the budget projections. We also find that his estimated overall budgetary effect is substantially overstated.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000510&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Alan J. Auerbach, William G. Gale, Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jul 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000510_TaxBreak_072803.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="739953"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Saver's Credit]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The 2001 tax act created a "saver's credit" that provides saving incentives for households with moderate income. The saver's credit provides a matching tax credit for contributions made to IRAs and 401(k) plans. The eligible contributions are limited to $2,000. Joint filers with income of $30,000 or less, and single filers with income of $15,000 or less, are eligible for a maximum 50 percent tax credit. (A 50 percent tax credit is the equivalent of a 100 percent match on an after-tax basis.)]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000498&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Peter Orszag, Matthew Hall)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 09 Jun 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000498_TaxFacts_060903.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="28706"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Reality Testing for Pension Reform]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Analyses of the private pension system typically focus on such issues as how to improve overage or encourage saving or prevent tax abuse or generate retirement income more equitably. Those issues are important, but the thesis of this paper is that more attention needs to be paid to the structure in which they are embedded. It examines the nuts-and-bolts of the private pension system, that is, the plans that comprise it and the rules that govern them. The architecture and machinery of the private pension system have much to teach us about directions for reform.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=410797&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle, Pamela Perun)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 01 May 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/410797_reality_testing_pension_reform.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="619527"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Whither Pensions? : A Brief Analysis of Portman-Cardin III]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[A major new proposal would largely continue in the same direction as EGTRRA's retirement savings provisions. On April 11, 2003, Representatives Portman and Cardin introduced "Portman- Cardin III." Although an official revenue estimate is This column examines the new Portman-Cardin proposals in the context of the pension system, the sluggish economy, and the deteriorating long-term budget outlook. On balance, the proposal would make the pension system more expensive and regressive, without materially improving its ability to generate adequate and secure retirement income; it would exacerbate the long-term budget outlook; and it would prove counterproductive as an economic stimulus.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000509&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Peter Orszag, William G. Gale)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 28 Apr 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000509_TaxBreak_042803.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="81328"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Private Pensions: Issues and Options]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[This paper provides an overview of the U.S. system of pensions and tax-preferred saving, examines the effects of current policies, and evaluates proposals for reform. In light of lengthening life spans, earlier retirement, and projected financial shortfalls in Social Security and Medicare, the financial status of the elderly in the future will depend heavily on private saving for retirement. The central goal of the private pension system should be to encourage or provide adequate and secure retirement income in a cost-efficient and equitable manner. Pension reforms should focus on expanding benefits for lower- and middle-income households, improving incentives and opportunities to diversify investments, increasing financial education, improving the structure and rules regarding cash balance plans, and simplifying and strengthening non-discrimination rules.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=310666&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale, Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 16 Apr 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/310666_TPC-DP9.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="125782"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Administration's Savings Proposals : Preliminary Analysis]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In its fiscal year 2004 budget, the Bush administration proposes to create a new set of tax-preferred accounts that would expand opportunities and consolidate rules for tax-advantaged saving. The initial reaction to the proposal was not particularly positive. Despite its uncertain prospects, the proposal is worth considering in detail because it would dramatically alter the tax treatment of saving, via the creation of Lifetime Saving Accounts (LSAs), individual Retirement Saving Accounts (RSAs), and Employer Retirement Saving Accounts (ERSAs). Some elements of the proposal - in particular, some of the simplifications - might form the basis of a useful pension reform package. Other elements are troubling because they would be regressive, could reduce saving among the most vulnerable populations, and would exacerbate the already bleak long-term budget outlook.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000469&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 03 Mar 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Enron Debacle : Lessons for Tax Policy]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The Enron debacle had potential implications in three areas of tax policy: tax-favored retirement plans, stock options, and differences in book versus tax accounting. The most important issue relates to the increasing riskiness of retirement plans that (1) can pay in a lump sum amount, (2) are of the defined contribution variety, and (3) may be excessively concentrated in employer stock. Proposals to remedy this issue even in a limited way may be unsuccessful if they do not address the especially favorable tax treatment of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). The spectacle of a purportedly profitable company paying little or no tax has become a common phenomenon. The Enron case suggests the need for more disclosure regarding the sources of book versus tax differences, if not some substantive corporate tax reforms.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=310622&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Jane G. Gravelle)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 13 Feb 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/310622_Enron.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="113989"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Legal and Institutional Impediments to Partial Retirement and Part-Time Work by Older Workers]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The paper describes the huge loss of skills and experience that will accompany the retirement of the baby boom generation. The problem can be mitigated by making longer work more attractive through offers of part-time employment and longer vacations. Unfortunately, a number of private practices and public policies have evolved over the years that encourage early retirement and make it challenging for employers and employees to negotiate flexible, partial retirement arrangements. Private and civil service defined benefit pension plans often penalize working beyond the late 50s even though they specify an official retirement age of 65. High health insurance costs for older workers also curb employment opportunities. The combination of tax law, IRS regulations, ERISA, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act create complex barriers to partial retirement that are not insurmountable, but can only be overcome with great effort and the risk of litigation. The authors make a number of suggestions for changing regulations and for new legislation.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=410587&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Rudolph G. Penner, Pamela Perun, C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 20 Nov 2002 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/410587_SloanFinal.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="276262"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[About Half of Dividend Payments Do Not Face Double Taxation]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The United States is often said to maintain a classical tax system, under which corporate profits are subject to double taxation, once at the corporate level when they are earned, and again at the individual level when they are paid out as dividends. The Bush administration is reportedly considering corporate tax reform options in part because of concerns about double taxation. Dividends are not taxed twice if they are paid to nonprofit institutions or foundations; federal, state or local governments; public or private pension funds; and 401(k) plans or Individual Retirement Accounts.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000460&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 11 Nov 2002 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000460_dividend.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="218768"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Should Stock Options Be Preferred to 401(k) &amp; Other Plans]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Congress must be careful in deciding whether or not to subject stock options to Social Security and unemployment tax.   There is certainly a case to be made for not doing so, but Congress could find itself in the funny position of offering special employment tax treatment to employees who have stock options while denying it to the same degree to those who buy company stock through a section 401(k) plan.  Moreover, if there is an employment tax preference for stock options but not for other compensation through stock or stock rights, companies may tend to use stock options in lieu of alternative compensation packages that might be more in the best long-run interests of the companies and the nation itself.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000913&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 05 Aug 2002 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Bubble Markets and Pension Fund Assumptions]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[This article examines when it is appropriate to adjust expected returns upward.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000914&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Fri, 19 Jul 2002 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Defining Tax Shelters and Tax Arbitrage]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[This brief looks at tax shelters and tax arbitrage, and how they are similar to and different from 1980s tax shelters.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000949&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2002 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Pension Reform Today and in 1974]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In the early 1970s, a Democratic Congress and a Republican President (Nixon) became concerned about the lack of pension funding, vesting, and coverage for most Americans. They decided to do something about it.  This president and Congress, I believe, are not less qualified or less concerned with the public good than elected officials in the early 1970s. But today they are much less likely to undertake major reform.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000953&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2002 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Will Enron Lead to Enhanced Retirement Security?]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The collapse of Enron brings out many tales, but none motivate action more than images of workers who now are left with little or nothing in the way of retirement plan benefits. In response, President Bush has requested legislation that would essentially remove some bars that prevent workers from selling their company stock, improve information, and limit the extent to which company officials could diversify their employer stock holdings when other workers are barred from doing so.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000001&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 11 Feb 2002 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Dominant Budget Issue Facing the New President, The]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Senior Fellow Eugene Steuerle makes the case for addressing the retirement of the baby boomers in economic policy sooner, rather than later. Delay, he argues, reduces the chances of long-term structural reform, makes large tax increases almost unavoidable, puts the oldest and most vulnerable of the elderly at greater risk, and invites further price and quantity controls in healthcare.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000094&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 27 Nov 2000 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Private Pension Reform : An Issue in Waiting]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Senior Fellow Eugene Steuerle describes the forces for private pension reform.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000131&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 23 Oct 2000 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[5500 Not-So-EZ, The]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Senior Fellow Euegene Steuerle discusses the sensibility of the Schedule 5500 EZ, a form used by so-called "one-participant retirement plans." The taxpayers involved are self-employed, with no employees or leased employees.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000080&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 07 Aug 2000 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Summers' Time: Preparing Treasury for the Future (Part 5 of 5)]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Senior Fellow Eugene Steuerle gives the Treasury Department tips on how to make the most of their final months before the 2000 election and prepare the Treasury for the future.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000139&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 24 Jul 2000 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Summers' Time: The Social Security Opportunity (Part 4 of 5)]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Senior Fellow Eugene Steuerle gives the Treasury Department tips on how to make the most of their final months before the 2000 election--specifically with regard to Social Security.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000138&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jul 2000 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Administration's USA Account Proposal (Part 3 of 3) : Part Three: Why It Won't Work as Crafted]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Senior Fellow Eugene Steuerle argues that the fatal flaw in the administration's strategy behind its private pension proposal is that it is not integrated either with social security reform or with further reform of the private pension system. Accordingly, if adopted as proposed, USA accounts would increase substantially the administrative burdens imposed on taxpayers and the IRS. Some parts of the proposal would be very hard to understand, and, as one consequence, participation could be reduced.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000166&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jun 1999 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Administration's USA Account Proposal (Part 2 of 3) : Part Two: What's Right About It]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Senior Fellow Eugene Steuerle argues that there are advantages to the administration's USA account proposal. It would attempt to use some general revenues to fortify and build up the private pension system. He concludes that with luck, it would develop and reinforce better saving patterns by individuals. The distribution of wealth, pension wealth, and tax subsidies for pensions would all be made more equal. Although the accounts would not be large, they might serve as a catalyst for future private pension reform as well.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000167&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 31 May 1999 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Administration's USA Account Proposal (Part 1 of 3) : Part One: Genesis]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Senior Fellow Eugene Steuerle comments on the apparent demise of the Clinton Administrations USA proposal, and examines its pros and cons.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000168&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 24 May 1999 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Private Pension Issues Raised By 'USA' Accounts]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Senior Fellow Eugene Steuerle describes the many related issues that Congress will have to address if it decides to develop legislation to try to encourage the expansion of private pension assets along the lines of a government match.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000175&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 22 Feb 1999 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[A Government Match for Private Pension Saving?]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Senior Fellow Eugene Steuerle examines the 1999 Clinton Administration proposal to create "USA" savings accounts. He concludes that the proposal for a match is one way to try to encourage greater saving, especially among the middle class, but that to be effective, a much more delicate crafting of legislation that simultaneously tries to address the excessive promises of social security along with the inadequacies of the existing private pension system would be required.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000083&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 08 Feb 1999 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA["Spending" the Surplus: Counting the Ways]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Senior Fellow Eugene Steuerle considers the math behind President Clinton's proposal to spend 62 percent of the surplus on Social Security, with another share to be allocated to Medicare, and that the remaining share be spent on other items, including a subsidy for new private pension accounts.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000177&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 01 Feb 1999 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Factors Influencing Retirement: Their Implications for Raising Retirement Age]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[This study sheds light on the impact on workers of a higher normal retirement age, using data from the 1990 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the 1994 wave of the Health and Retirement Study.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000207&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Cori E. Uccello)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 1998 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000207_retire_factors.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="407167"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Pension and Saving Incentives By the Bushel-Load]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Senior Fellow Eugene Steuerle lays out the complexity of the variety of pension plans offered by policymakers.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000115&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 29 Jul 1998 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Simple Arithmetic Driving Social Security Reform, The]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The debate over Social Security reform is awash with numbers on changes in tax rates, benefit reductions, and saving patterns required to bring the system into balance for the long run. In this article, Senior Fellow Eugene Steuerle skips around the more elaborate calculations and presents the financing dilemma in a simpler, more understandable, form.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000085&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 20 Apr 1998 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Mandated Saving and the Fallacy of Aggregation]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Because Social Security spends tax collections almost immediately, rather than putting them aside to fund future retirement costs, it is believed by many to reduce net national saving at a time when other private and public saving are considered too low. This low savings rate coincides with a matured private pension system that does not provide much in the way of benefits for about half the population. These considerations have led many, including Senior Fellow Eugene Steuerle, to consider whether government ought to mandate that deposits be made to private saving accounts. In this essay, he concludes that there are several good reasons to favor mandated saving, but one should not exaggerate the extent to which it will increase net saving in society.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000086&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 23 Dec 1996 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Privatizing Social Security: A Third Option (Part 2 of 2) : Part Two: Specifics of a Voluntary Alternative]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Senior Fellow Eugene Steuerle explains how raising the rate of contribution to private accounts by a significant amount, without a substantial increase in mandates or taxes might help clarify the Social Security privatization debate.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000087&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 16 Dec 1996 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Privatizing Social Security: A Third Option (Part 1 of 2) : Part One: Basic Rationale]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Senior Fellow Eugene Steuerle comments on Social Security privatization options, noting that none say much of anything about the current private pension system, its advantages and limitations, nor about the ways that new, mandated, private accounts would be integrated with private accounts already existing. If proposals for privatization of social security move to a more mature second stage, then reform of the private retirement system should be considered at the same time -- Steuerle suggests one such option.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000088&amp;RSSFeed=Pensions,_Tax_Incentives_for_Saving.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 09 Dec 1996 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>
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