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    <title>Tax Policy Center: Distribution of Taxes and Income</title>
    <link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org</link>
    <description>Tax Policy Center reports on: Distribution of Taxes and Income - The Tax Policy Center is a joint venture of the Urban Institute and Brookings Institution. The Center is comprised of nationally recognized experts in tax, budget, and social policy who have served at the highest levels of government.</description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <copyright>Copyright 2007 Tax Policy Center</copyright>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2009 21:00:17 EST</lastBuildDate>
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    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Opacity of Marginal Tax Rates]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Suppose that a taxpayer earns an additional dollar of
income. How much tax would she owe on that dollar? A
natural way to answer this question would be to look up
the taxpayers statutory tax rate - the tax rate corresponding
to her tax bracket and filing status.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001336&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Rosanne Altshuler, Jacob Goldin)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2009 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
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    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Distributional Effects of Tax Expenditures]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The largest tax preferences for housing, health care, and retirement saving reduce federal revenues by about 3 percent of GDP.  They raise after-tax income proportionally more for higher income groups than lower income groups, but raise income proportionately less for those at the very top. The net distributional effects depend on how these tax preferences are financed. If paid for with higher marginal tax rates, they benefit upper-middle income taxpayers at the expense of both lower-income and the highest-income taxpayers, but if paid for by lower per-capita spending, all high-income groups gain and all low-income groups lose.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411922&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Benjamin H. Harris, Katherine Lim, Eric Toder)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2009 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411922_expenditures.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="1031658"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Tax Stimulus Report Card: Conference Bill]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[This report card evaluates the provisions of the Finance and Ways & Means Committees' conference tax stimulus bill (the "American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009"). The evaluation is preliminary and does not include all of the provisions in the bill most notably we omit provisions related to state and local debt and recovery zone credits. TPC will update the report card if significant changes occur before Congress passes the bill.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411839&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Rosanne Altshuler, Leonard E. Burman, Howard Gleckman, Dan Halperin, Benjamin H. Harris, Elaine Maag, Kim Rueben, Eric Toder, Roberton Williams)</author>
        <pubDate>Fri, 13 Feb 2009 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411839_conference_reportcard.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="283816"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Tax Stimulus Report Card: Comparing the House and Senate Bills]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[This report card compares the provisions of the House and Senate tax stimulus bills (the "American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Plan of 2009"). The combined evaluation is preliminary and does not include all of the provisions in the bill - most notably we omit provisions related to state and local debt and recovery zone credits. TPC will update the report card as we learn more about specific provisions and as the stimulus bills move through Congress.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411834&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Rosanne Altshuler, Howard Gleckman, Roberton Williams)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 03 Feb 2009 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
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    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Tax Stimulus Report Card: Senate Finance Committee]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The Tax Policy Center has graded the key tax provisions of the pending Senate stimulus bill (the "American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Plan of 2009"). Our grades, which rely on the bill's legislative language, focus on how well these measures would boost the economy in the short run. Accompanying write-ups describe current law, the proposed change, and the short- and long-term effects on the budget, the economy, fairness and tax complexity.  We will update the report card as we learn more about the provisions and as the stimulus bill moves through Congress.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411830&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Rosanne Altshuler, Leonard E. Burman, Howard Gleckman, Dan Halperin, Benjamin H. Harris, Elaine Maag, Kim Rueben, Eric Toder, Roberton Williams)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2009 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
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    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Tax Stimulus Report Card: House Bill]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The Tax Policy Center has graded the key tax provisions of the pending House stimulus bill (the "American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Plan of 2009"). Our grades, which rely on the bill's legislative language, focus on how well these measures would boost the economy in the short run. Accompanying write-ups describe current law, the proposed change, and the short- and long-term effects on the budget, the economy, fairness and tax complexity.  We will update the report card as we learn more about the provisions and as the stimulus bill moves through Congress.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411827&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Rosanne Altshuler, Leonard E. Burman, Howard Gleckman, Elaine Maag, Eric Toder, Roberton Williams)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 26 Jan 2009 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411827_stimulus_reportcard.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="145366"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[President-Elect Obama's Tax and Stimulus Plans]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[During the presidential campaign, Barack Obama proposed a comprehensive tax plan that would raise taxes on high-income taxpayers, cut taxes for low- and middle-income households, and lose $2.9 trillion dollars of revenue over ten years. Obama will take office with the economy in sharp recession and a deteriorating fiscal situation, made worse by new spending on a bailout plan. Faced with those crises, Obama says he will pursue both his campaign tax plan and additional tax-related proposals addressing problems created by the downturn. This paper examines revenue and distributional effects of the tax plan and describes some stimulus proposals.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411816&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Roberton Williams)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 08 Jan 2009 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411816_obamas_tax.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="781582"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[How Big Are Total Individual Income Tax Expenditures, and Who Benefits from Them?]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Analysts often add up tax expenditures to estimate an aggregate cost, but those tallies are inaccurate because they ignore interactions among provisions. We estimate that interactions raise the cost of nonbusiness tax expenditures by 5 to 8 percent, depending on whether an AMT patch is in effect. In 2007, these tax expenditures totaled about $750 billion5.5 percent of GDP. While tax expenditures benefit taxpayers in all income groups, high-income households gain more relative to income than low-income ones. Although the AMT eliminates some tax preferences, it increases overall tax expenditures because most AMT taxpayers face higher marginal tax rates.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001234&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Eric Toder, Leonard E. Burman, Christopher Geissler)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 04 Dec 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001234_tax_expenditures.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="154654"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[When Marginal and Statutory Tax Rates Differ]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[From an economic perspective, marginal tax rates play a critical role in determining the consequences of a change in tax policy. In an uncomplicated tax system the marginal rate is simply equal to the statutory rate. For millions of taxpayers, however, marginal tax rates differ markedly from statutory rates. Because of the tax code's wide array of phase-ins and phaseouts the majority of taxpayers face a different marginal rate than their statutory rate. Marginal and statutory rates differ for about two-thirds of married filers and heads of households and for about one-third of single filers.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001230&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Benjamin H. Harris, Ruth  Levine)</author>
        <pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001230_marginal_rates.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="486379"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Taxes under Obama and McCain]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Tax policy has been a major issue in the Presidential election campaign, with both candidates proposing extensive changes. The candidates take very different approaches to tax policy. The main differences are two: first, McCains plans would reduce revenues by significantly more than Obamas; and second, McCains would be substantially less progressive, especially among very high income taxpayers. From the standpoint of growth or simplicity, both plans disappoint. It is hard to believe that either set of changes would have significant growth effects on the economy.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001223&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale, Benjamin H. Harris)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 03 Nov 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001223_taxes.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="176897"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Presidential Candidates' New Tax Proposals - October 27, 2008]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In response to the deterioration of the economy and the decline in asset values, Senators McCain and Obama have offered new proposals related to unemployment compensation, retirement savings, taxation of capital gains, and job creation. Although the proposals would provide some benefit, they have significant shortcomings.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411781&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Roberton Williams)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 27 Oct 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411781_candidates_october.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="50149"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Back from the Grave : Revenue and Distributional Effects of Reforming the Federal Estate Tax]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In this paper we review the current wealth transfer tax rules and the changes introduced in 2001. We offer an overview of the methodology underlying the TPC's estate tax model and then use the model to estimate the number of estate tax filers, taxable returns, and the distribution of burden under current law. Finally, we investigate the revenue and distributional effects of several proposals to reform the estate tax, including those put forth by the presidential candidates.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411777&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Katherine Lim, Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 20 Oct 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411777_back_grave.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="655716"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Impact of the Presidential Candidates' Tax Proposals on Effective Marginal Tax Rates]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[A taxpayer's effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) is the percentage of an additional dollar of income that would be paid in federal income tax. An individual's EMTR could affect the decision to work or save more, or avoid income tax. We use the TPC's microsimulation model of the federal tax system to calculate EMTRs under current law and under the presidential candidates' proposals. The Obama plan would lower EMTRs for the majority of households in 2009. Close to 80 percent of the population would see no change in their EMTR under Senator McCain's plan; most others would face lower rates.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411759&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Katherine Lim, Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411759_candidates_tax_proposals.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="180377"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[An Updated Analysis of the 2008 Presidential Candidates' Tax Plans: Executive Summary - Revised September 15, 2008]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Both John McCain and Barack Obama have proposed tax plans that would substantially increase the national debt over the next ten years, according to a newly updated analysis by the non-partisan Tax Policy Center. Compared to current law, TPC estimates the Obama plan would cut taxes by $2.9 trillion from 2009-2018. McCain would reduce taxes by nearly $4.2 trillion. Obama would give larger tax cuts to low- and moderate-income households and pay some of the cost by raising taxes on high-income taxpayers.  In contrast, McCain would cut taxes across the board and give the biggest cuts to the highest-income households.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411750&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Roberton Williams, Howard Gleckman)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411750_updated_candidates_summary.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="67994"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Refundable Credits Have Cut Taxes for Low-Income Households]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In 1979, federal taxes claimed 8 percent of the income of households in the lowest quintile of the income distribution.1 Over the following three decades, the average
effective tax rate (ETR)  taxes as a percentage of income  fell by nearly half to 4.3 percent in 2005. Most of the decline resulted from a sharp drop in the individual income tax, primarily due to expansion of the earned income tax credit and the child tax credit (CTC). Because the EITC is refundable and the CTC is partially refundable, they can reduce a households tax liability below zero and generate a net payment.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001208&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Roberton Williams)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001208_refundable_credits.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="1505688"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Who Pays Capital Gains Tax?]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Fewer than one in seven individual income taxpayers reported taxable capital gains in 2006. Over half of taxpayers with gains had incomes below $75,000, but most capital gains were reported by very high income taxpayers. The 3 percent of returns with AGI over $200,000 reported 31 percent of AGI and 83 percent of capital gains; the 0.3 percent with AGI over $1,000,000 reported 15 percent of AGI and 61 percent of capital gains. Many more Americans accrue capital gains on corporate shares they hold within tax-deferred employer-sponsored retirement plans, but they do not pay capital gains tax on these gains.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001201&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Eric Toder)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 31 Jul 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001201_Capital_gains_tax.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="477120"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[An Updated Analysis of the 2008 Presidential Candidates' Tax Plans]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Tax and fiscal policy will loom large in the next president's domestic policy agenda. Nearly all of the tax cuts enacted since 2001 expire at the end of 2010 and the individual alternative minimum tax (AMT) threatens to ensnare tens of millions of Americans. While a permanent fix palatable to both political parties has proven elusive, both candidates have proposed major tax changes. This report describes how we performed our modeling and analysis, outlines the major tax proposals, and discusses the implications of their policies for the revenue raised, taxpayer economic activity, and the distribution of the tax burden.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411741&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Surachai Khitatrakun, Greg Leiserson, Jeff Rohaly, Eric Toder, Roberton Williams)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jul 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411741_updated_candidates.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="310886"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[An Updated Analysis of the 2008 Presidential Candidates' Tax Plans: Executive Summary]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Both John McCain and Barack Obama have proposed tax plans that would substantially increase the national debt over the next ten years, according to an updated analysis by the non-partisan Tax Policy Center. Compared to current law, TPC estimates the Obama plan would cut taxes by $2.8 trillion from 2009-2018. McCain would reduce taxes by nearly $4.2 trillion. Under current law, the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts would expire in 2010 and the Alternative Minimum Tax would remain in full force.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411742&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Roberton Williams, Howard Gleckman)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jul 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411742_updated_candidates_summary.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="59390"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Distribution of the 2001-2006 Tax Cuts : Updated Projections, July 2008]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Since 2001, Congress has passed a major tax bill almost every year. Most have reduced taxes significantly and, since they were not accompanied by spending cuts, the resulting deficits have increased the national debt. The tax cuts total almost $2.2 trillion over ten years, and that total may be vastly understated if some or all of the cuts are extended beyond their scheduled expiration date of 2010. In addition, the cuts exacerbated the growing problem of the alternative minimum tax (AMT). Barring legislative action, more than 33 million taxpayers will fall prey to the AMT in 2010.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411739&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Greg Leiserson, Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411739_tax_cuts.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="189430"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Individual Alternative Minimum Tax: Historical Data and Projections : Updated June 2008]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Congress enacted a minimum tax in 1969 to guarantee that high-income individuals paid at least some tax. The AMT now threatens to grow from a footnote in the tax code to a major component affecting tens of millions of taxpayers. Although most lower- and middle-income taxpayers will remain unaffected by it, policymakers need to deal with the explosive growth of the AMT from an obscure tax affecting only 20,000 filers in 1970 to one affecting more than 33 million-a third of all taxpayers-by 2010. This document provides updated estimates of AMT participation, revenue, and distribution.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411703&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Greg Leiserson, Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jun 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411703_individual_amt.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="89231"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[A Preliminary Analysis of the 2008 Presidential Candidates' Tax Plans (Summary)]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Tax and fiscal policy will loom large in the next president's domestic policy agenda. Nearly all of the tax cuts enacted since 2001 expire at the end of 2010 and the individual alternative minimum tax (AMT) threatens to ensnare tens of millions of Americans. While a permanent fix palatable to both political parties has proven elusive, both candidates have proposed major tax changes. This summary outlines our analysis of the 2008 presidential candidates' tax plans. The full length report is also available.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411702&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( The Tax Policy Center)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 24 Jun 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411702_CandidateTaxPlans_summary.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="50542"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[A Preliminary Analysis of the 2008 Presidential Candidates' Tax Plans (Full Report)]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Tax and fiscal policy will loom large in the next president's domestic policy agenda. Nearly all of the tax cuts enacted since 2001 expire at the end of 2010 and the individual alternative minimum tax (AMT) threatens to ensnare tens of millions of Americans. While a permanent fix palatable to both political parties has proven elusive, both candidates have proposed major tax changes. This report describes how we performed our modeling and analysis, outlines the major tax proposals, and discusses the implications of their policies for the revenue raised, taxpayer economic activity, and the distribution of the tax burden.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411693&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( The Tax Policy Center)</author>
        <pubDate>Fri, 20 Jun 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411693_CandidateTaxPlans.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="282024"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Distribution of Federal Taxes, 2008-11]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Overall, the federal tax system is highly progressive. On average, households with higher incomes pay taxes that are a larger share of their income. The tax cuts passed since 2001 have reduced progressivity with the notable exception of the 2008 stimulus package. Almost all provisions of the tax cuts are set to expire by the end of 2010. Barring legislative action, effective tax rates will rise across the income spectrum in 2011 with the largest increases in the upper income classes. This paper summarizes the Tax Policy Center's latest estimates of the distribution of federal taxes for 2008 through 2011.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001189&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 11 Jun 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001189_federal_taxes.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="98905"/>
		
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    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Individual Taxpayers and Federal Tax Reform : Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Finance]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In the next few years, several factors will push tax issues to the forefront of policy discussions. First, under current law, almost all of the Bush Administration's tax cuts will expire at the end of 2010. A second factor is the rapid growth in the alternative minimum tax (AMT), which will increase the inequity and complexity of the tax system. A third issue is the expected increase in government spending over the next several decades. Despite these pressures on the system, tax changes are not inevitable, and achieving meaningful reformthat is, with substantial design improvementswill require strong political leadership. Gale's testimony focuses on some overarching principles that should guide tax reform efforts.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001178&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 14 May 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001178_Gale_tax_reform.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="58480"/>
		
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    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Effective Tax Rates for Different Kinds of Households]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[One measure of the tax burden imposed on households is their effective tax rate (ETR)the total taxes they pay measured as a percentage of their pretax income. ETRs vary across types of households because of differences in sources and levels of income and in how the tax system treats taxpayers in different situations. Each year the Congressional Budget Office estimates ETRs for individual and corporate income taxes, payroll taxes, and excise taxes for different types of households, as well as all households as a group.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001122&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Roberton Williams)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 14 Jan 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
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    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Tax Considerations in a Universal Pension System (UPS)]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The inadequacy of the current U.S. public and private pension systems may warrant the establishment of a universal pension system (UPS), which would cover all workersfull-time and part-timeand require them to contribute at a level that can help provide them with adequate incomes when they retire. This paper develops options for a system of individual accounts to which, starting in 2007, each employee or self-employed worker would be required to contribute 3 percent of covered payroll (i.e., 3 percent of up to $97,500 in 2007). The UPS we describe would raise the total "replacement rate" for average wage men to 49.0 percent of final wagesprovided Social Security is fixedor 39.8 percent if not]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411593&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Adam Carasso, Jonathan Barry Forman)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 20 Dec 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411593_universal_pension_system.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="169120"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Revenue and Distributional Effects of the Individual Income and Estate Tax Provisions of Senator Thompson's Plan for Tax Relief and Economic Growth]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Republican Presidential Candidate Fred Thompson has announced a tax plan that combines tax cut extensions, additional tax cuts, and an election to pay tax under a new alternative tax system that would substitute a larger standard deduction for all current deductions and credits and have two rates of 10 and 25 percent. Thompson's plan would reduce federal revenues by $6-7 trillion over ten years, amounting to a reduction of almost 20 percent below current projections, and would be highly regressive. This article describes the proposed changes in the individual income and estate tax and examines their implications for revenue and the distribution of tax burdens.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411585&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Greg Leiserson, Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 10 Dec 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411585_Thompson_Plan.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="521145"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Distributional Effects of the Major Individual Income Tax Provisions of H.R. 3970]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[On October 25, 2007, Ways and Means Committee Chairman Charles Rangel (D-NY) unveiled H.R. 3970, The Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, sweeping tax reform legislation that would provide for a revenue-neutral repeal of the individual alternative minimum tax (AMT). This paper describes the proposal and provides distribution tables that analyze the impact of the major individual income tax provisions in the bill.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411564&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Greg Leiserson, Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Fri, 26 Oct 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411564_tax_provisions_hr.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="152872"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Tax Fairness, the 2001-2006 Tax Cuts, and the AMT : Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In this testimony Burman discusses the issues of tax fairness, the 2001 to 2006 tax cuts, and the individual alternative minimum tax. Burman argues that while the federal tax system mitigates economic inequality, the recent tax cuts have disproportionately benefited those at the top, while also increasing the number of people potentially subject to the AMT. He concludes with a brief discussion of how to fix the AMT in a fiscally responsible manner.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=901111&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 06 Sep 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/901111_burman_tax_fairness.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="90411"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Fewer Businesses Are Organized As Taxable Corporations]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Corporations that are taxed under subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code pay a separate entity-level tax on their income (the corporate income tax) and their owners pay additional tax on corporate dividends and capital gains on sales of corporate shares. Other businesses are taxed as flow-through entities; they file tax returns and report their income but do not pay an entity-level tax. This article discusses the decline in both the share of businesses organized as C corporations and their share of business receipts between 1994 and 2004.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001095&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Eric Toder, Julianna Koch)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 06 Aug 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001095_taxable_corporations.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="499120"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[End the Break On Capital Gains]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In this Washington Post commentary, senior fellow Len Burman explains why the capital gains tax break does more harm than good and why Congress should close the loophole once and for all.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=901101&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 30 Jul 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Americans are taught from an early age to aspire to homeownership, and several long-standing federal institutions and regulations support owner-occupied residential housing. The income tax deduction for mortgage interest payments is possibly the best-known federal housing policy. Evidence suggests, however, that the mortgage interest deduction (MID) does little if anything to encourage homeownership. We propose a tax credit and a subsidized saving vehicle for first-time home buyers, financed by the elimination of the MID. Relative to current policy or to the President's Advisory Panel's recommendations, our proposals would be less expensive, more progressive, and more effective in encouraging homeownership.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001084&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale, Jonathan Gruber, Seth Stephens-Davidowitz)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 27 Jun 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001084_Encouraging_Homeownership.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="599927"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Distribution of Federal Taxes]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Overall, the federal tax system is highly progressive: On average, households with higher incomes pay taxes that are a larger share of their income. The 2007 average effective federal tax rate  tax paid as a percentage of cash income  rises from 3.4 percent for the bottom quintile  or fifth  of the income distribution to 25.9 percent for the top fifth.1 Within the top quintile, average rates climb from 30.4 percent for the top 1 percent to 32.8 percent for the top one-tenth of 1 percent. The individual income tax is the most progressive of the major revenue sources while payroll taxes for Social Security and Medicare are regressive.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001091&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 25 Jun 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001091_distribution_federal_taxes.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="123468"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Towards a More Consistent Distributional Analysis]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Tax reform is likely to combine elements of income and consumption taxes. Special problems arise in developing consistent methods for allocating incremental options that transcend the boundaries between income and consumption taxes. This paper discusses issues in allocating consumption taxes and shows how the choice of allocation method affects conclusions for two prototypes. It then discusses how hybrid income-consumption taxes and corporate taxes ought to be allocated under different scenarios. A concluding section sums up.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411480&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Jane G. Gravelle, Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 19 Jun 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411480_Towards_Consistent.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="257021"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Reforming the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The child and dependent care tax credit (CDCTC) is a nonrefundable tax credit designed to help offset the expenses of providing care for children under the age of 13 or disabled dependents as long as a parent or caretaker is working or searching for work. In theory, a low-income family can qualify for a maximum $2,100 credit. The credit is not refundable, however, and families with low incomes generally owe little or no income tax. Thus, the theoretical maximum rarely applies in practice. This paper examines the revenue and distributional implications of making the CDCTC fully refundable.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411474&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 11 Jun 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411474_child_tax.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="982171"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Two-Thirds of Tax Units Pay More Payroll Tax Than Income Tax]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[April 15 is synonymous with taxes in the United States, but most Americans actually pay more payroll taxes than federal income taxes. In 2006 workers and employers each paid 6.2 percent Social Security tax on the first $94,200 of earnings and 1.45 percent Medicare tax on all wages. While the statutory obligation to pay payroll taxes is split evenly between workers and employers, most economists believe that the employer tax usually translates into lower wages, so workers bear the full burden of the tax. Thus, the total payroll tax rate equals 15.3 percent of earnings for most workers.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001065&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Greg Leiserson)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 09 Apr 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001065_Tax_Units.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="124223"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Fixing the AMT by Raising Tax Rates]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[House Ways and Means Select Revenue Measures Subcommittee Chair Richard E. Neal, D-Mass., recently told reporters that fixing the alternative minimum tax was likely to involve increases in statutory tax rates rather than cutting back on preferences in the tax code. He said the former was "probably more realistic." Or is it? Raising rates at first seems easier than dealing with preferences that people want to keep. However, the simple fact is that real reform involves winners and losers. The only way to avoid that problem is to keep the status quo. But the status quo isn't tenable either: Taxpayers are increasingly dissatisfied with an AMT that continually raises their tax burdens, and in fairly arbitrary ways.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001066&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 09 Apr 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001066_Fixing_AMT.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="265244"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[State Individual Income Tax Progressivity]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Personal income tax systems vary widely across states, leading to different levels of progressivity.  Forty-three states and the District of Columbia have an individual income tax.  Eight of these states apply a single tax rate to all taxable income, while the remaining states have multiple tax brackets and rates.  Even among states with graduated rates, most systems are fairly flat.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001064&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Carol Rosenberg)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 28 Mar 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001064_State_Individual.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="148973"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Fairness in Tax Policy : Testimony Before Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government, House Appropriations Committee]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In this testimony, Burman summarizes the trends in inequality, examines the role the federal tax system has played in mitigating inequality, and discusses the effect of the tax cuts enacted since 2001. He concludes that while the income tax system provides one mechanism of redistributing the gains of our dynamic free-market economy more equitably, the immediate benefits of the recent tax cuts have accrued disproportionately to those with very high incomes and have undermined tax progressivity. Without knowing how they will be financed, it is impossible to determine how these tax cuts will ultimately affect the distribution of economic burdens in the United States.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=901050&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 05 Mar 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/901050_Burman_Fairness.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="69026"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Share of Taxpayers Who Itemize Deductions Is Growing]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Individual taxpayers may claim some expenses (for example, mortgage interest, state and local taxes, and so on) as itemized deductions or claim a standard deduction. The standard deduction eliminates tax liability for many low-income filers and simplifies tax return preparation. Between 1995 and 2004, the share of itemizers increased from 29 percent to 35 percent. In addition, itemizers accounted for more than two-thirds of all adjusted gross income reported on tax returns and 80 percent of tax liability.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001054&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Eric Toder, Carol Rosenberg)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 15 Feb 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001054_Share_of_Taxpayers.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="512919"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The President's Proposed Standard Deduction for Health Insurance : An Evaluation]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The paper describes the new standard deduction for health insurance, proposed in the FY2008 Budget, and evaluates the extent to which it would meet its stated goals of expanding health insurance coverage and restraining healthcare spending, and its effects on the distribution of tax burdens in the short and long terms.  The basic approach would improve the market for health insurance, but inadequate attention was paid to problems in the nongroup market or those facing households with low incomes. In consequence, the plan could actually reduce overall insurance coverage.  The paper suggests a variety of ways in which the proposal could be improved so more people would be covered, including those with low incomes or in poor health.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411423&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Jason Furman, Greg Leiserson, Roberton Williams)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 15 Feb 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411423_Presidents_Standard_Deduction.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="170285"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The President's Health Care Proposal Misses the Point]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[President Bush's new health care proposal ignores the most important problems in the current health care system: a lack of guaranteed affordable, accessible, and adequate insurance coverage for those with modest incomes or with high health needs. The proposal's focus on limiting the tax exemption for employer contributions and creating tax equity between the purchase of group and non-group insurance does virtually nothing to redress this situation. In fact, the proposed tax change would continue to reward those with high incomes more than low-income individuals, and the tax equity across markets could endanger coverage for the most vulnerable in most states.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=901040&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Linda J. Blumberg, John Holahan)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 01 Feb 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Prescribing Better Under Bush's Health Plan]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The nation spends more than $250 billion annually on tax incentives for workers to buy health insurance, and the cost is rising fast. Nonetheless, 47 million people lack coverage. By any standard, we aren't getting our money's worth. This article discusses President Bush's proposed health plan, which would give everyone the same income tax deduction as long as they purchased health insurance, and the potential problems with this policy. It suggests that a properly designed voucher is a better vehicle for correcting the existing problems with health insurance.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001051&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 31 Jan 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001051_Prescribing_Better.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="437029"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[From Personal Income to Taxable Income, 1950-2004]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[While much of the tax debate usually swirls around statutory tax rates, those rates must be applied to a base. The tax base can be approximated by the amount of taxable income that is reported on taxable returns. This article examines changes in the fraction of Americans' personal income subject to tax from 1950 to 2004 and the factors that explain these changes over time.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001049&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Adam Carasso, C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jan 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/10001049_Personal_Income.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="558758"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Options to Fix the AMT]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The individual alternative minimum tax (AMT) was originally designed to limit the amount of tax sheltering and to assure that high-income filers paid at least some tax.  The current AMT, however, has strayed from those original goals and under current law the tax will affect over 23 million taxpayers in 2007. This brief examines a variety of implications of AMT repeal or reform and an array of options for offsetting the revenues lost under such options.  The ideal solution would be to address the AMT in the context of a complete overhaul of the income tax, such as the proposal made by the Presidents Advisory Panel on Federal Income Tax Reform.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411408&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Greg Leiserson, William G. Gale, Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Fri, 19 Jan 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411408_fix_AMT.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="261021"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[AMT Coverage by State, 2004]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Many taxpayers must calculate their federal income tax liability under two sets of rules: those applying to the regular income tax and those of the alternative minimum tax. If a taxpayer owes more tax under the alternative rules, then the difference is paid as AMT. The AMT hits people in some states harder than it does in others because state and local income and property taxes are not allowed as itemized deduction against the AMT and because states vary based on the income of their residents. This column discusses AMT participation rates by state and the general expansion of the AMT across all the states.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001047&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Carol Rosenberg)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 14 Dec 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001047_AMT_Coverage_2004.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="166197"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Distribution of the 2001-2006 Tax Cuts : Updated Projections, November 2006]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Since 2001 Congress has passed a major tax bill almost every year. The 2001-2006 tax cuts total approximately $2 trillion over ten years, and that total may be vastly understated if some or all of the tax cuts are extended beyond their scheduled expiration at the end of 2010. The long-term effect of the 2001-2006 tax cuts on the distribution of income will depend on how they are paid for, but their immediate effect has been skewed in favor of those with high incomes. This review presents a brief summary of the major provisions of the tax cuts, traditional distribution tables for the tax cuts by cash income class and cash income percentile, the distribution of tax units by the size of tax cuts and individual characteristics, and distribution tables for the tax cuts by cash income class and cash income percentile for three different illustrative financing options.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411378&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Greg Leiserson, Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 15 Nov 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411378_tax_cuts.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="50000"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Tax Policy: Facts and Figures : October 2006]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The early years of the 21st century have been marked by a major tax bill almost every year. This fact sheet looks at the impact of these laws on taxpayers, especially on who benefits and who doesnt, and discusses some unfinished business, including the future of the estate tax and the individual alternative minimum tax.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=901006&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( The Tax Policy Center)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 23 Oct 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/901006_taxpolicy.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="70460"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Reforming Tax Incentives into Uniform Refundable Tax Credits]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The federal tax code provides about $500 billion each year in incentives intended to encourage socially-valued activities, including homeownership, charitable contributions, health insurance, and education. Under our proposal, the default for all tax incentives intended to promote socially beneficial behavior would be a uniform refundable tax credit. These tax credits would provide a much more even and widespread motivation for socially-valued behavior than the current set of tax incentives, and could help smooth out fluctuations in household income and macroeconomic demand, all of which would improve economic efficiency.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1001020&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Fri, 08 Sep 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001020_reforming_tax_incentives.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="50000"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Contrary to President's Claim, Large Majority of Americans Ultimately Are Likely to Lose From Tax Reconciliation Bill]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In his recent statement responding to the tax reconciliation bill conference agreement, President Bush asserted that failure to extend the tax cuts contained in the bill would be "disastrous" for "all working Americans." In this analysis, we consider three possible approaches to paying for the tax cuts: one that approximates financing largely through cuts in federal programs, one that approximates financing through a combination of program cuts and progressive tax increases, and a third that approximates financing entirely through progressive tax increases. Under all three scenarios, the average household with income below $100,000 would lose from the tax bill.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000995&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Aviva Aron-Dine, Leonard E. Burman, Isaac Shapiro)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 05 Jun 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000995_reconciliation_bill.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="201032"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Widespread Prevalence of Marriage Penalties : Testimony Before the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Citizens pay an overall marriage penalty when their combined social welfare benefits less taxes are lower when they are a married couple than when they are two single individuals.  Because marriage is optional, marriage penalties or subsidies are assessed primarily for taking wedding vows, not for living together with other adults (although there are some exceptions).]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=900952&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 03 May 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/900952_Steuerle_050306.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="750609"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Reform and Equal Justice]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Anyone familiar with tax and expenditure legislation knows full well that interest groups constantly win special favors from federal and state legislators.  For a long time I have struggled with how to make better use of the principle of equal justice to restrain or eliminate bad policy.  Here are a few thoughts to get the conversation started.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000945&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 17 Apr 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000945_EP_041706.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="455022"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Taking a Checkup on the Nation's Health Care Tax Policy: a Prognosis : Statement of Leonard E. Burman before the United States Senate Committee on Finance]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In this testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Len Burman summarizes the latest data on who has health insurance and who doesn't, outlines the various tax subsidies that exist for health insurance, examines how those subsidies affect the market for health insurance and employment, and briefly comments on some reform options.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=900934&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 08 Mar 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/900934_burman_030806.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="85272"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Marginal Tax Rates, 1955-2005]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) and later the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) decreased marginal tax rates for four person families with earnings at half the median income and twice the median income. Neither piece of legislation changed the marginal tax rate for a family of four with earnings at the median level who faced the lowest marginal tax rate already. If EGTRRA and JGTRRA are allowed to expire, the marginal tax rate of the half-median family will once again be the highest.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000875&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Elaine Maag)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 13 Feb 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000875_Tax_Fact_02-13-06.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="508415"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Taxing Capital Income : Do We? Should We? Can We? Can We Not?]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, American Tax Policy Institute, and Tax Analysts cosponsored a conference entitled Taxing Capital Income: Do we? Should we? Can we? (Can we not?). The one-day conference brought together leading economists, lawyers and accountants from across the political spectrum to discuss issues surrounding the choice of income or consumption as a tax base.  Sessions addressed each question in the title. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director of the Congressional Budget Office, presented the luncheon address, and a wrap-up panel featured Henry Aaron, Leonard Burman and Dan Halperin. Drafts of the conference papers are available at the ATPI website, http://www.americantaxpolicyinstitute.org/.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411273&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( The Tax Policy Center)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 10 Jan 2006 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411273_ATPI_transcript.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="452246"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Income Taxes and Income Inequality Since 1979]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Following decades of relative stability, income inequality has risen sharply in the United States since the 1970s.  Households at the top of the income distribution saw their pretax incomes grow most; similar trends and magnitude are present for after-tax incomes, too.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000849&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Troy Kravitz)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 24 Oct 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000849_Tax_Fact_10-24-05.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="270354"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Social Security Reform: One More Time]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[There has been much breast-beating lately about future entitlement spending burdens. The out-year liabilities of Social Security seem quite large$11 trillion in present-value terms. How can the nation ever deal with such major funding problems? While I have offered a specific plan in the past, most notably when I chaired one of the Social Security advisory councils ten years ago, in this paper I focus only on a broader strategy. While the present Social Security system is not by itself terribly far out of long-term actuarial balance, when combined with Medicare, the country is facing major problems in funding projected entitlement spending down the road.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411447&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Edward Gramlich)</author>
        <pubDate>Sun, 25 Sep 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411447_Social_Security.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="71405"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Suppose They Took the AM Out of the AMT?]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The individual alternative minimum tax (AMT) was originally intended to assure that high-income people paid at least some tax, but the AMT was poorly designed and affects more middle-income people every year. The AMT raises a lot of tax revenue, however: reforming or eliminating it could cost $500 billion over the next decade. Some suggest that the best option would be to make the AMT the regular tax system. This paper examines the implications of basing a reformed tax system on AMT rules. (A shorter version of this paper is forthcoming in the 97th Annual Conference NTA Papers and Proceedings.)]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=311212&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, David Weiner)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 25 Aug 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/311212_TPC_DiscussionPaper_25.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="416213"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Distributional Consequences of Federal Assistance for Higher Education : The Intersection of Tax and Spending Programs]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[For nearly a decade, federal higher education subsidies have increasingly been delivered through the tax code rather than through direct spending programs such as grants, loan subsidies, and work study. This paper reviews the results of using new modules in the TRIM and Tax Policy Center microsimulation models to estimate the distributional impacts and expenditure and revenue effects of major federal higher education tax and spending policies. In addition, the paper reports estimates of the effects of some prototypical policy changes in the Pell Grant program as well as in the Hope and Lifetime Learning tax credits.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=311210&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Elaine Maag, Peter Orszag, Jeff Rohaly, John O&apos;Hare)</author>
        <pubDate>Fri, 19 Aug 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/311210_TPC_DiscussionPaper_26.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="505853"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Who Receives Homeownership Tax Deductions and How Much?]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Some of the costliest tax expenditures the federal government allows go to subsidizing homeownership.  In 2004, the total tax expenditure value of the mortgage interest deduction was $70.2 billion while the value for the real estate tax deduction was $19.3 billion.  Fifty-four percent of these sums went to taxpayers at or above $100,000 of income and 72 percent went to taxpayers at or above $75,000.  Very few taxpayers receive these two subsidies at low incomes-as most low-income tax filers owe little tax, do not itemize, and are less likely to own a home-and very many taxpayers receive them at higher incomes.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000804&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Adam Carasso)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 01 Aug 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000804_Tax_Fact_8-01-05.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="517440"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Estate Tax ReformA Third Option]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Several pressures are combining to force lawmakers to seek a more permanent resolution to the estate tax issue.  This article suggests a possible compromise that would enhance the ability of wealthy individuals to avoid paying tax to government and still pass on significant assets to their heirs-but only if they make substantial contributions to charity.  The compromise includes giving a substantial credit against estate tax for charitable gifts.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000797&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 18 Jul 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000797_EP_071805.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="458185"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[How to Better Encourage Homeownership]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The way federal housing benefits are doled out suggests a U-shaped curve; subsidies are heaped on most households at higher incomes and some at very low incomes.  Those in between get little. This brief describes revenue-neutral reforms that would level out the U-shaped curve and deliver ownership subsidies more equitably and efficiently to lower-to-middle-income households. Converting home-related tax deductions into refundable, capped credits introduces greater progressivity into the tax system, encourages homeownership among those at lower incomes, and curtails government subsidies for ever greater amounts of home borrowing.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=311193&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Adam Carasso, C. Eugene Steuerle, Elizabeth Bell)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 29 Jun 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/311193_IssuesOptions_12.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="193783"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Tax Credits for Health Insurance]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Over 40 million Americans under age 65--the overwhelming majority of them in working families--lack health insurance. The public ultimately shoulders the burden of paying for the medical treatment of those lacking insurance, either through higher taxes or higher health care costs. Expanding health coverage through the tax system may not be the most efficient path, but tax subsidies appear the only game in town for expanding the federal role in the provision of health insurance.  This policy brief examines implications of major expansions in tax credits for health insurance, starting with the President's refundable tax credit proposal.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=311189&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Jonathan Gruber)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jun 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/311189_IssuesOptions_11.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="187475"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Making Tax Incentives for Homeownership More Equitable and Efficient]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[While many recent evaluations of the effects of housing subsidies in the tax code focus on the choice between renting and owning, this paper examines the distribution and effectiveness of various changes to these subsidies. Specifically, we examine several revenue-neutral reforms that would level out the current U-shaped curve of housing benefits and deliver ownership subsidies more equitably and efficiently to lower-to-middle-income households. Implementing reform requires careful design, administrative, and behavioral considerations. Appropriately done, converting home-related tax deductions into refundable, capped credits could encourage homeownership at lower incomes and curtail government subsidies for ever greater amounts of home borrowing.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411180&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Adam Carasso, C. Eugene Steuerle, Elizabeth Bell)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 08 Jun 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411180_TPC_DiscussionPaper_21.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="461637"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Impact of Tax Reform on Low- and Middle-Income Households : Testimony Submitted to the House Committee on Ways and Means]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[This testimony focuses on how the income tax system affects low- and middle-income taxpayers and the potential effects of tax reform. Despite its flaws and some recent erosion, the income tax is highly progressive and is an important source of income support for low-income households. Tax reform could help low- and middle-income households by reducing their tax burdens further, but some so-called fundamental tax reform proposals could shift the tax burden away from those most able to pay to those least able. Moreover, the claimed economic gains from such proposals are speculative at best, based solely on theoretical models that have little relationship to economic reality.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=900818&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 08 Jun 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/900818_Burman_060805.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="71862"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Tax Credits for Health Insurance]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Over 40 million Americans under age 65the overwhelming majority of them in working familieslack health insurance. The public ultimately shoulders the burden of paying for the medical treatment of those lacking insurance, either through higher taxes or higher health care costs. Expanding health coverage through the tax system may not be the most efficient path, but tax subsidies appear the only game in town for expanding the federal role in the provision of health insurance.  This paper examines implications of major expansions in tax credits for health insurance, starting with the President's refundable tax credit proposal.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411176&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Jonathan Gruber)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jun 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411176_TPC_DiscussionPaper_19.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="398459"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Expanding Reach of the Individual Alternative Minimum Tax]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The Expanding Reach of the Individual Alternative Minimum Tax focuses on both the original minimum tax and its successor, the individual alternative minimum tax (AMT). The minimum tax and the AMT have applied in the past to a small minority of high-income households. But barring a change in law, this "class tax" will soon be a "mass tax". By 2010, repealing the AMT will cost more than repealing the regular income tax. This report updates an article originally published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives to reflect tax laws passes in 2003 and 2004 and the latest economic projections.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411194&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411194_expanding_reach_AMT.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="69783"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Expanding Reach of the Individual Alternative Minimum Tax : Testimony submitted to the United States Senate Subcommittee on Taxation and IRS Oversight of the Committee on Finance]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Leonard Burman's testimony, submitted to the U.S. Senate Finance Subcommittee on Taxation and IRS Oversight, focuses on both the original minimum tax and its successor, the individual alternative minimum tax (AMT). Both the minimum tax and the AMT have applied in the past to a small minority of high-income households. But barring a change in law, this "class tax" will soon be a "mass tax." By the end of the decade, repealing the AMT will cost more than repealing the regular income tax. The testimony updates an article originally published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives to reflect tax laws passed in 2003 and 2004 and the latest economic projections.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=900812&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 23 May 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/900812_Burman_052305.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="962705"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Options for Reforming the Estate Tax]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Retargeting the estate tax to very wealthy households and lowering its rates would blunt much of the criticism against it while retaining many of its advantages. This brief explains how the estate tax works and examines who is affected by it under current law. It discusses how reform would affect tax revenues, the distribution of tax burdens, farms and small businesses, and charitable giving and bequests. A concluding section discusses ways to reduce the tax's complexity.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000780&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale, Leonard E. Burman, Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 18 Apr 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000780_Tax_Break_4-18-05.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="489647"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Options to Reform the Estate Tax]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Retargeting the estate tax to very wealthy households and lowering its rates would blunt much of the criticism against it while retaining many of its advantages. This brief explains how the estate tax works and examines who is affected by it under current law. It discusses how reform would affect tax revenues, the distribution of tax burdens, farms and small businesses, and charitable giving and bequests. A concluding section discusses ways to reduce the tax's complexity.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=311153&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 23 Mar 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/311153_IssuesOptions_10.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="112752"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[A Comparison of Income and Consumption : A Presentation to The President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[William Gale's PowerPoint(tm) presentation to The President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform on the merits of an income tax versus a consumption tax.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000776&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 16 Feb 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000776_Gale_TRP_presentation.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="29809"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model : Documentation and Methodology for Version 0304]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The Urban-Brookings microsimulation tax model is a powerful tool for federal tax policy analysis.  The model calculates tax liability for a representative sample of households, both under the rules that currently exist (current law) and under alternative scenarios.  Based on these calculations, the model produces estimates of the revenue consequences of different tax policy choices, as well as their effects on the distribution of tax liabilities and marginal effective tax rates (which affect incentives to work, save, and shelter income from tax).  The model is also a useful input to research on the effects of taxation on economic behavior.  This paper describes the tax model's data sources and details its underlying statistical techniques.  We also explain the capabilities of the tax model's individual income tax calculator and describe how the model estimates and distributes corporate, payroll, and estate taxes.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411136&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Jeff Rohaly, Adam Carasso, Mohammed Adeel Saleem)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 10 Jan 2005 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411136_documentation.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="470825"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Tax Reform: Prospects and Possibilities : Statement before the Committee on the Budget United States House of Representatives]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The gains in efficiency, equity, and simplicity from systematic tax reform could be substantial. However, to achieve those gains requires attention to many details. Tax reform efforts have failed often, but they have also succeeded, especially when rising problems created the opportunity and demand for reform, and tough issues were tackled in a spirit of bipartisan cooperation.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=900749&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 06 Oct 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/900749_Steuerle_100604.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="253997"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Bush Administration Tax Policy : Distributional Effects]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[This paper evaluates the distributional effects of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, and is the second paper in a series on tax policy in the Bush Administration. We show that the tax cuts enacted to date increase the disparity in after-tax income; after-tax income rises by a larger percentage for high-income households than low-income households. Once the eventual financing of the tax cuts is taken into account, the distributional effects will likely be even more regressive.  If the eventual policy adjustments needed to finance the tax cuts impose burdens that are proportional to income: about 80 percent of households, including a large majority of households in every income quintile, will end up worse off after the tax cuts plus financing than before; most families (i.e., with children) and most taxpayers with small business income will be worse off; and even if the tax cuts raise economic growth significantly, most households will end up worse off when the financing is included. We also address several criticisms of distributional analysis.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000689&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale, Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 27 Sep 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000689_TaxBreak_092704.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="114965"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Quietly, The Taxes Are Changing]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[[Marketplace] While everyone is focusing on those things President Bush and Senator John Kerry disagree about, perhaps they should be paying attention to those things on which they do agree.  Senior fellow and Tax Policy Center co-director, Len Burman, takes a look at what he calls the "bad bipartisan legislation" that is the middle-class tax cut in this installment from Marketplace.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=900742&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 21 Sep 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Tax Preparer Usage Rises Significantly Since 1981]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The use of tax preparers provides a simple metric of tax complexity, by providing evidence on the extent to which taxpayers are willing or able to prepare their own returns. It is by no means a perfect metric, though. People use preparers for reasons unrelated to the complexity of the tax system, for example, to save time or to receive "rapid-refund loans." As these factors changed over time, so would the use of preparers.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000690&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 20 Sep 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000690_TaxFacts_092004.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="116340"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Distributional Effects of Defined Contribution Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[This paper incorporates retirement saving incentives into the Tax Policy Center microsimulation model and analyzes the distributional effects of current tax preferences for saving. As a share of income, tax-preferred saving incentives provide the largest benefits to households with income between $75,000 and $500,000, roughly the 80th to 99th percentile of the income distribution. In 2004, the top 20 percent of tax filing units by income will receive 70 percent of the tax benefits from new contributions to defined contribution plans and almost 60 percent of IRA tax benefits.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=311029&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, Matthew Hall, Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 19 Aug 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/311029_TPC_DP16.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="249239"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Senator Kerry's Tax Proposals]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[This note provides a very preliminary summary and distributional analysis of Senator Kerry's tax proposals. Some details of the proposal are not publicly available. The following summary is based on information from Kerry's website (speeches, press releases, and policy papers), communications with campaign staff and advisors, and some guesses about how the proposals will be made operational. The Tax Policy Center will update and correct this as more details become available.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000634&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Jeff Rohaly)</author>
        <pubDate>Fri, 23 Jul 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000634_KerryPlan.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="288945"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Effects of Recent Fiscal Policies on Today's Children and Future Generations]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Recent and proposed fiscal policies--the tax cuts, proposals to make them permanent, and the Medicare prescription drug bill--will hurt economic prospects for most of today's children and all future generations. The programs will leave economic growth largely unchanged, but will redistribute resources from future to current generations and, within each generation, from low- and middle-income families toward an affluent minority. These effects exacerbate the impact of underlying federal budget trends and processes that will place significant, imminent pressure on funding for children's programs. An expanded program of investments in children is both feasible and desirable.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=311030&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale, Laurence J. Kotlikoff)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jul 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/311030_TPC_DP15.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="103573"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Be Careful What You Wish For]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Tax cut advocates favor lower taxes and smaller government, but so far they've gotten lower taxes and bigger government.  In this Marketplace commentary, Len Burman argues that the resulting deficits will translate into much higher taxes in the future, especially on those with high incomes.  In the long run, they may wish they hadn't won so many legislative victories.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000662&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jun 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Effects of Recent Fiscal Policies on Children]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Today's children represent the future of the century. This notion that children and future generations should have better living standards than current generations is central to universally shared views of economic progress. This article examines the effects of recent fiscal policies on children and the direct and indirect effects of one set of policies--the tax cuts and the Medicare spending increases that have been proposed and enacted since January 2001--on the long-term economic prospects of today's and tomorrow's youth.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000660&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale, Laurence J. Kotlikoff)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jun 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000660_TaxBreak_060704.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="581484"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Distributional Effects of the 2001 and 2003 Tax Cuts and Their Financing]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Tax cuts are not free; they must be financed with some combination of tax increases or spending cuts. The central goal of this paper is to apply this standard insight from public finance to the analysis of the distributional effects of making the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts permanent. We estimate not only who benefits directly from the tax cuts, but also who benefits and who loses once the financing of the tax cuts is considered. We consider two scenarios: one in which each household pays an equal dollar amount to finance the tax cuts and one where each household pays the same share of income. In both cases, more than three-quarters of households end up worse off if the tax cuts are made permanent and financed. In addition, there are large aggregate transfers from the majority of low- and middle-income households to an affluent minority. These results show that, far from simply "giving people their money back," making the tax cuts permanent would impose significant losses on tens of millions of American households.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=411018&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale, Peter Orszag, Isaac Shapiro)</author>
        <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jun 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411018_tax_cuts.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="131986"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Let It Snow: Opportunity Time For the Treasury Secretary]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Management theory holds that the major goals for an organization need to be clearly specified and few in number. When workers are given multiple goals, it is often hard to distinguish among them. Failure to achieve primary goals also becomes easier when one has the excuse that he was working on the many other goals.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000657&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 31 May 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000657_EP_053104.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="47809"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Let It Snow: Opportunity Time For the Treasury]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Almost no one who has served at the Treasury can help but feel pride at the integrity, vitality, and importance of the institution.  With a heritage going back to Alexander Hamilton, time after time it has had to grapple with the economic and financial problems facing the nation--and come up with solutions. Treasury must not get tied up in trying to please every constituent group represented by some political hack in the administration waiting to move on to his new lobbying job. It must start with principles and follow them to their logical conclusions.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000652&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 24 May 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000652_EP_052404.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="45339"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Small Business and Flow-Through Entities]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The composition of income reported on tax returns changes markedly as income increases. On most tax returns, wages and salaries are the dominant source of income. Capital gains become more significant at higher incomes, but even at adjusted gross income (AGI) of $200,000 to $500,000, they only averaged about 12 percent of income in 2000.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000637&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000637_TaxFacts_041204.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="53908"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Congress Spends More to Increase Number of Uninsured]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Congress continues to let the cost of a tax subsidy grow without bound. Perhaps one day Congress will take on the broader issue of entitlement reform, forcing all entitlement programs to go through some of the hurdles required of discretionary programs. Then those programs would be allowed to increase in cost from year to year only after a vote was taken and consideration given to the costs and benefits of any expansion. When that day comes, tax entitlements like the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance should be treated more like any other entitlement on the direct spending side of the budget.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000638&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000638_EP_041204.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="43265"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[President Turns to IRS to Raise Levels of Math Education]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The president's effort to "leave no child behind" has run into opposition on a variety of fronts. The Congress complained that the money was too little, insisted that the president spend less to reduce the deficit, and then passed the Omnibus Reconciliation and Giveaway Acts of 2003 and 2004. In desperation, the president has done what all modern presidents have done when they cannot achieve their goals through direct appropriations: Turn to the IRS for help.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000622&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000622_EP_030104.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="45268"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Key Thoughts on RSAs and LSAs]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In his FY2005 budget, released Monday, President Bush proposes a set of new tax-preferred saving accounts (which were first presented in last year's budget). Under the Administration's proposal, two new types of individual accountscalled Lifetime Saving Accounts (LSAs) and Retirement Saving Accounts (RSAs)would be created. This note provides information to help assess these proposals.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000600&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, Peter Orszag)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 04 Feb 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000600.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="27618"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Income Tax Statistics for Sample Families, 2003]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In the U.S. federal income tax system, the effective marginal tax rates and the average tax rates vary significantly from the statutory tax rates. These differences are important since they influence the incentives to work, save and to comply with the tax system. This article measures these differences for single individuals and families with different income levels and discusses why these differences exist. Often, hidden taxes and subsidies interact, making the effective marginal tax rate an amalgam of different effects.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000594&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Mohammed Adeel Saleem)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 19 Jan 2004 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000594_TaxNotes_011904.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="470231"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Redistribution under OASDI : How Much and to Whom?]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[In one of the most comprehensive, intergenerational studies on Social Security's redistribution of lifetime income, the authors find that (1) Social Security, or Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), is slightly progressive in that persons with high lifetime earnings on average receive lower rates of return than persons with low lifetime earnings; (2) For most generations, the retirement component (OASI) by itself achieves little if any redistribution across income groups, while Disability Insurance (DI) is progressive, it is a relatively small program, and so does not affect overall redistribution under OASDI, except for key groups; and (3) The groups who benefit most when DI is "added" to OASI are men, workers in the bottom earnings quintile, high school dropouts, and minorities. [ Brookings Institution]]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000596&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Lee Cohen, C. Eugene Steuerle, Adam Carasso)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000596_redistribution_under_OASDI.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="52707"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Searching for a Just Tax System]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Despite the intensity of the debate over President Bush's tax policies, all political factions seem to agree that tax and spending programs should, on average, distribute economic resources from the rich to the poor. The arguments involve the amount of redistribution; only fringe groups ask whether it should occur at all. This paper will give a brief history of various arguments regarding taxes. If history repeats, the distributional and social values expressed by tax policy will continue to jump around, but on a fairly small playing field.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=410907&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Rudolph G. Penner)</author>
        <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/410907_TPC_DP13.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="89858"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[The Incredible Shrinking Budget for Working Families and Children]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Programs for working families and children are scheduled to shrink rapidly over the next few years, squeezed between rising expenditures on programs for the elderly and declines in tax revenues.  This scenario will play out even if only modest defense and international needs are factored into the division of federal funds.  Temporary deficit financing can delay the day of reckoning very little, since borrowing against the future only compounds today's problems.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=310914&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 01 Dec 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/310914_incredible_shrinking_budget.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="152732"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Composition of Income Reported on Tax Returns]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The composition of income reported on tax returns changes markedly as income increases. On most tax returns, wages and salaries are the dominant source of income. Capital gains become more significant at higher incomes, but even at adjusted gross income (AGI) of $200,000 to $500,000, they only averaged about 12 percent of income in 2000.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000639&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Deborah Kobes)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 10 Nov 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000639_TaxFacts_111003.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="339849"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Distribution of Federal Taxes and Income, 1979-2000]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The Congressional Budget Office recently released new estimates of the distribution of taxes and income between 1979 and 2000. CBO includes all federal taxes except estate and gift levies; counts as income all cash income, taxes paid by businesses, 401(k) contributions, and in-kind benefits; and uses standard incidence assumptions. Income is aggregated across household members and adjusted for household size.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000566&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( William G. Gale)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000566_TaxFacts_092903.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="26630"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Hidden Taxes and Subsidies]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[An individual's marginal tax rate--the additional tax that would be owed on an additional dollar of income--is an important indicator of how the tax system affects incentives to work, save, and comply with the tax system. It is natural to think of marginal tax rates as identical to the statutory tax rates--currently 10, 15, 25, 28, 33, and 35 percent--but this is not true for many people.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000561&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Mohammed Adeel Saleem)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000561_TaxFacts_091503.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="29365"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Is the Tax Expenditure Concept Still Relevant?]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The term "tax expenditure" refers to departures from the normal tax structure designed to favor a particular industry, activity, or class of persons. Most budget experts view the tax expenditure budget as a useful tool in managing the size and scope of the federal government, but a growing contingent of conservative critics has raised questions about the concept. The paper examines tax expenditure measurement issues, the debate about their relevance and new measures tentatively explored by the Bush Administration's budget, the way tax expenditure estimates are used in the U.S., and how they might be made more useful.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=410813&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman)</author>
        <pubDate>Tue, 02 Sep 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/410813_NTA_Tax_Expenditure.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="217275"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Can the Progressivity of Tax Changes Be Measured in Isolation?]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Several nonprofit groups such as the Tax Policy Center and Citizens for Tax Justice as well as several governmental entities provide tables on the distributional effects of tax changes. Analysts then suggest that these tax cuts are progressive, proportional or regressive by comparing such measures as the percentage change in after-tax income for different income classes. To know the effect of tax changes on the distribution of income, it is necessary to take into account what the government does with the money.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000558&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( C. Eugene Steuerle)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 01 Sep 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000558_EP_090103.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="33331"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[A Brief History of Marginal Tax Rates]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[A person's marginal tax rate, the tax rate on their last dollar of income, may influence their decision to work and save. As marginal tax rates increase, the after-tax reward from working an additional hour or saving more decreases. Although the actual effect on economic decisions is uncertain, economists view the marginal tax rate as a gauge of the efficiency cost of taxation.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000559&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Elaine Maag)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 01 Sep 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000559_TaxFacts_090103.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="216456"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Nonfilers and Filers With Modest Tax Liabilities]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[The effects of income tax changes on the economy and the distribution of after-tax income depend in part on the population that does not file a tax return or that does file a return but owes little or no net income tax liability. These types of tax units featured prominently in the debate over the 2003 tax legislation. The Tax Policy Center (TPC) model contains information on both tax filers and nonfiling tax units. This article describes the household composition of nonfilers and filers with modest tax liability for 2003.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000548&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Peter Orszag, Matthew Hall)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 04 Aug 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000548_TaxFacts_080403.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="28500"/>
		
    </item>


    <item>
	<title><![CDATA[Income Tax Brackets Since 1985]]></title>
	<description><![CDATA[Before enactment of the Tax Reform Act on 1986, the individual tax code included 25 marginal tax rates.  No more than 10 percent of tax filers were in a single bracket and eight brackets included less than 1 percentage of filers.  Read this article to learn more about the history of Income Tax Brackets.]]></description>
	<link>http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?id=1000547&amp;RSSFeed=Distribution_of_Taxes_and_Income.xml</link>
		<author>info@taxpolicycenter.org ( Leonard E. Burman, Deborah Kobes)</author>
        <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jul 2003 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
		
		<enclosure url="http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000547_TaxFacts_072803.pdf" type="application/pdf" length="27955"/>
		
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